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Friends, Cliques and Gifts:  
Social Proximity and Recognition in Peer-Based Tournament Rituals 
 
Abstract 
 
Two main accounts of the effect of proximity between candidates competing for recognition and 
members of the evaluating audience in the underlying social structure can be extrapolated from extant 
literature on peer-based tournament rituals and cultural fields. Following a Bourdieusian tradition, one 
account – which we label self-reproduction – insists on the catalyzing effect of social proximity in shaping 
recognition along relational lines. Drawing from recent scholarship on social evaluation, a second 
account – which we label intellectual distance – suggests that social proximity deters recognition. We 
probe the influence of different articulations of social proximity (i.e., direct ties, cliquishness and 
reciprocity) on recognition by studying awarding decisions within the context of the Norwegian 
advertising industry. Interviews with key informants and econometric results suggest that, while self-
reproduction tends to prevail over intellectual distance, these effects co-exist and their relative 
influence varies across levels of recognition. We gauge the relative saliency of the two accounts by 
using a mix-method approach. Important implications for research on social evaluation and 
recognition in peer-based tournament rituals are drawn. 
Keywords: Peer evaluation, audiences, jury, direct ties, reciprocity, cliques/clans, status, awards, 
recognition, tournament rituals, cultural fields, advertising. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is no form of symbolic capital so ubiquitous, powerful, and widely talked about as the award. 
Operating as judgment devices that channel evaluating audiences’ attention and create sharp 
discontinuities between winners and losers, awards serve as crucial mechanisms for shaping the 
prestige structure of existing fields (Goode, 1978; English, 2005). As a result, selecting whom to 
recognize for an award invokes fascinating social dynamics. It entails interpersonal judgments of 
worth, calls into question standards of evaluations, initiates deference, and ignites antagonism among 
those who strive for recognition and those who regulate access to valued symbolic and material 
resources (Bourdieu, 1993; Reschke, Azoulay, & Stuart, 2017). Not surprisingly, recognition has been 
the object of considerable attention from social scientists interested in understanding who/what is 
recognised and by which metrics (e.g., Allen & Parsons, 2006; Cattani & Ferriani, 2008; Heinich, 2009; 
Rossman, Esparza, & Bonacich, 2010). 
Despite working in different research streams, scholars concerned with the social drivers of 
recognition typically agree on two types of arguments. One class of explanations focuses on the 
characteristics of the producers, i.e., the actors who are part of the consideration set of the audiences 
in charge of allocating symbolic capital. Studies in this tradition have drawn attention to such 
characteristics as producers’ status, reputation and categorical cues as critical judgment devices 
structuring the audience-producer interface (Bielby & Bielby, 1994; Zuckerman et al., 2003; Rossman 
et al., 2010; Braden, 2016). Central to this stream of work is the general idea that an actor’s identity 
becomes the lens through which her offers are evaluated (Merton, 1968). Another line of inquiry 
examines particular features of the evaluating audiences, including their disposition, cognitive 
orientation or structural position, and how they ultimately affect award allocation choices (Negro & 
Leung, 2012; Cattani, Ferriani, & Allison, 2014; Fini, Jourdan, & Perkmann, in press). These studies 
have identified a number of factors shaping evaluative outcomes beyond the “true” quality of the 
object under evaluation, thus contributing to unveiling the “social magic” that creates discontinuity 
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out of continuity (Bourdieu, 1984: 117). Yet, by focusing on either side of the producer-audience 
interface, these perspectives have overlooked the existence of social relationships between audience 
members and producers that often characterize the settings in which awards allocations occur (for an 
exception see Aadland, Cattani, & Ferriani, 2018). In particular, when we zoom out from the individual 
producer or the audience level, the focus on the producer-audience dyad raises an important question 
to which extant literature lacks compelling answers: How does the underlying social structure cutting 
across the audience-producer evaluative interface affect the allocation of recognition among 
competing candidates? 
Two motivations propel our interest in addressing this question. First, social proximity 
between producers and audiences is a defining feature of peer-based evaluative settings, where 
producers and audiences partake in the same professional community and so may have few degrees 
of separation from each other (Heinich, 2009). Yet, as Lamont notes, there is still “an urgent need for 
more systematically cumulative work on […] the impact of prior network contacts on evaluative […] 
outcomes” (2012: 214).  Second, and more crucially, the existence of “social intercourses” (Blau, 1977: 
32) between audiences and producers exposes in a particularly vivid manner the tension between 
achievement and ascription that lies at the core of meritocratic evaluative settings, whereby decision-
makers are supposed to justify their deliberations based on standards that can be articulated 
independently of the available options (Correll et al., 2017). To illustrate this point, consider the 
controversial deliberation of the 67th Venice Film Festival’s Jury led by Quentin Tarantino. Although 
Tarantino asserted that the award decisions were based on film’s intrinsic merits, his former partner 
Sofia Coppola won the award for best picture for her film – Somewhere – and his long-time friend 
Hollywood director Alex de la Iglesia won two awards, one of which was for best Director for the 
film Balada Triste De Trompeta (A Sad Trumpet Ballad). Also, his mentor (he was the executive producer 
of Tarantino’s 1992 debut feature film Reservoir Dogs), Monte Hellman, won a special career prize that 
the Jury created ad hoc for him. Journalists and commentators the world’s over voiced their outrage 
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pointing fingers at Tarantino’s social intercourses with award recipients, with many of them also 
referring to the Jury’s awarding decisions as manifestations of a “clan” effect.1 But when asked whether 
he thought he had privileged his acquaintances, Tarantino replied that it was Hellman himself who 
around 20 years ago had taught him how award-giving at festivals works: “I remember talking to him 
[Hellman] in 1992 at the Sundance Film Festival, when I was there with my film Reservoir Dogs … I 
actually had a friend on the jury and he told me that a friend on the jury is your worst enemy as they would 
be too embarrassed to give you a prize” (reported in The Hollywood Reporter, September 12th, 2010). 
There is a paradoxical quality to this example and, more broadly, to the research question that 
prompted it. On the one hand, the fact that recognition and rewards may be patterned along relational 
lines rather than achievement-based criteria resonates with the key claim in contemporary sociological 
theory that modern institutions often fall short of the meritocratic allocation ideal (Parsons & Shils, 
1951). Intellectually, this claim owes much to the work of Bourdieu and the profound influence his 
view has had on the understanding of consecration rites in symbolic and cultural fields as mechanisms 
for reproducing the authority of the élites.2 Following Bourdieu’s relational approach to consecration, 
to the extent that socially proximate actors are seen as privileged targets of interaction beyond the 
level that is justified on the basis of “objective” achievements, relationships that increase audience-
producer proximity are expected to catalyze recognition. On the other hand, Tarantino’s reply in the 
previous example aptly illustrates how social proximity between audience and candidates may increase 
susceptibility to claims against moral character (Hahl, Zuckerman, & Kim, 2017) to such a degree that 
it deflects recognition away from those who are socially closer to the audiences. This point dovetails 
                                                          
1 See for instance:  
http://elnacional.com.do/triunfa-en-venecia-el-clan-tarantino-con-premio-a-coppola-y-de-la-iglesia/;  
http://www.la-razon.com/index.php?_url=/la_revista/clan-Tarantino-consagra-Venecia_0_1248475178.html; 
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2010/09/12/espectaculos/a09n1esp; 
http://lahora.com.ec/index.php/noticias/show/1101016851/-
1/El%20%E2%80%98clan%20Tarantino%E2%80%99%20triunfa%20en%20Venecia.html#.WLczcjs1-00. 
2 Earlier versions of this idea can be found also in Parsons and Shils’ (1951) characterization of universalism in terms of 
the social relationship that exists between evaluators (henceforth audience members) and prospective candidates. Blau 
(1964) too noted that in distinguishing between universalistic and particularistic standards of evaluation “the differentiating 
criterion is whether the standards that govern people’s orientation to each other are dependent on or independent of the 
particular relationships that exist between them” (p. 265). 
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with Bourdieu’s classic observation about the crucial importance of “disinterestedness” in cultural 
fields as a marker of authenticity. Likewise, explicit reliance on relational cues may jeopardize the 
credibility of the consecrating institution by cheapening the prestige of the activity that formal honours 
are expected to assert (Goode, 1978; Heinich, 2009). If anything, these observations imply the 
opposite effect: social proximity should deter recognition.  
Aadland et al. (2018) offer supportive evidence of this dual effect in what is, to our knowledge, 
the only study to date to explore the effect of proximity between candidates competing for recognition 
and members of the evaluating audience in the underlying social structure. Yet their framework does 
not elaborate a general theoretical account that encompasses both positive and negative effects of 
social proximity on recognition, thus they only advance speculative interpretations. In the present 
article, we erect a framework for understanding this duality by combining Bourdieusian insights into 
prestige dynamics in symbolic fields with recent scholarship more attentive to actual evaluative 
practices on the ground (Lamont, 2009; Heininch, 2009). The framework allows us to articulate two 
contrasting accounts of the consequences of audience-candidate social proximity on recognition 
outcomes. We label these two accounts self-reproduction and intellectual distance, respectively, and gauge 
their relative saliency in explaining the catalyzing (self-reproduction) or inhibiting (intellectual 
distance) effect of social proximity between producers and audiences on audiences’ awarding 
decisions.3 Although we develop the arguments for each of these mechanisms separately, we also 
emphasize how the observed empirical outcomes are the result of their counterbalancing forces. 
                                                          
3 Research on knowledge spaces often employs the notion of distance to capture the extent to which two different 
knowledge domains relate to one another (Piezunka & Dahlander, 2015; Wang, Veugelers, & Stephan, 2017), or the 
relatedness between evaluators’ expertise and the knowledge embodied in social objects subject to evaluation (Boudreau 
et al., 2014). Instead, intellectual distance here refers to the symbolic value of disavowing personal interests, which is 
foundational to the perceived legitimacy of evaluative judgments in cultural fields (Bourdieu, 1993). In particular, our usage 
builds on the observation that cultural producers seek to gain authority in the cultural field by distancing themselves from 
self-serving interests (Shymko & Roulet, 2016). The idea that intellectual distance is driven, at least in part, by a search for 
legitimacy is especially echoed in Chong’s (2013, 2015) analysis of the epistemic norms that peer reviewers in the literacy 
field uphold in order to buttress the perceived fairness of their judgments, and so dissipate potential concerns about their 
moral character. Chong’s work, in turn, owes much intellectually to Lamont’s (2009, 2012) extensive evidence indicating 
that extra-cognitive considerations such us morals, emotions and feelings of self-validation as fair judges, whose judgment 
matter, are intrinsic to the evaluation process in peer-based evaluative settings. 
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Accordingly, we do not follow a standard hypothesis-based falsifiability logic – whereby explicit 
predictions that embrace one or the other account are tested – thus causing the invalidation of the 
competing effect. Our goal, in other words, is not to establish whether one or the other account is at 
work, but to ascertain which one prevails and under what conditions.  
Analytically, we capture the saliency of these effects by examining the following three 
articulations of social proximity: direct ties, cliquishness and reciprocity. Conceptual reasons 
corroborated by our interview data and archival sources suggest that each of these variables provides 
different yet complimentary insight into the relational underpinnings of audiences’ evaluation of 
producers’ offers. To derive such insight, we rely on a unique dataset on the Norwegian advertising 
field, first introduced by Aadland (2012) and then further elaborated by Aadland et al. (2018). We 
integrate this dataset with new field-based qualitative evidence that we combine with large sample 
statistics to gain stronger analytical leverage. We use this evidence to expose the existence of self-
reproduction and intellectual distance, as well as gauge their relevance in shaping audience evaluations. 
Consistently with a Bourdieusian perspective, our econometric findings lend general support to self-
reproduction. Yet our findings also afford a window into other recognition-inhibiting mechanisms 
that point to evaluators’ self-understanding as fair judges and stewards of evaluative practices that 
signal disinterestedness and intellectual distance, so suggesting that self-reproduction is not the only 
dominant effect. We tease out the relative importance of these effects by leveraging the unique features 
of our data along with an econometric approach ideally suited to explore how such effects vary across 
ordered levels of recognition. We then conclude by reflecting on the conditions that may amplify or 
inhibit one effect relative to the other, thereby providing new impetus to the growing scholarly debate 
on social evaluation’s impact on prestige dynamics in cultural fields. 
THEORETICHAL ORIENTATION 
Fields, Rituals and Rewards  
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The ability to impose judgments of symbolic legitimacy, or the power to consecrate, is central to the 
understanding of the ritualistic dynamics by which cultural fields operate. Typically, formal rites of 
cultural consecration occur in the course of tournament rituals entailing the presentation of prizes and 
awards that recognize excellence. These rituals operate via ceremonial judgments of worth in which 
authoritative field audiences with the power to dispense symbolic capital disclose their preferences by 
selectively allocating esteem and approbation among competing producers (Anand & Watson, 2004). 
Examples of such tournaments include the Oscars, Grammy Awards, Tony Awards, the Judgment of 
Paris wine-tasting contest, and so on. What is at stake in such rituals, however, is not just rank, fame 
or prestige, but also and perhaps more importantly, “the disposition of the central tokens of value in 
the society in question” (Appadurai, 1986: 21), or, in other words, the very definition of what 
constitutes value in a field. As such, they are entangled in complex social dynamics that invoke 
evaluative practices (Lamont, 2009), principles of justification (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991) and 
orders of worth (Stark, 2017).  
Perhaps one of the most prominent manifestations of these social dynamics is the 
disproportionate amount of formal recognition accorded those who already occupy high-status 
positions. Merton’s notion of the “Matthew effect” is a reminder that honour begets honour, 
attracting recognition and resources that make subsequent honours more likely (Merton, 1968). For 
instance, studies have shown that screenwriters of equivalent accomplishment receive more 
recognition when represented by high rather than low status agencies (Bielby & Bielby, 1994). The 
same is true for the consecration of movie professionals who work with élite collaborators (Rossman, 
et al., 2010). But there are other subtle ways in which producer- or audience-level socially derived 
stratifying criteria may creep into the rewarding choices of evaluators. Producers’ legitimacy as 
inferred, for instance, by their position within the core or the periphery of the field’s social structure 
is one of those criteria (Cattani & Ferriani, 2008). The consistency between the producers’ offers and 
those of their masters is another such criteria, as evidenced in the analysis of the ritualistic conferral 
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of stars to top chefs in haute cuisine (Slavich & Castellucci, 2016). Other studies point to the patterning 
of cultural producers’ recognition along gendered lines (Allen & Lincoln, 2004; Schmutz & Faupel, 
2010). Socio-cognitive fit between the schema-based identity – defined by the audience – and the 
features of the producers under scrutiny is another well-known stratifying selection mechanism that 
operates independently from the actual skill or ability on the part of the producer. For example, 
evidence on the bestowal of awards of distinction on wine producers in the context of wine tasting 
rituals is consistent with this idea (Negro & Leung, 2012). A similar view focuses on the 
correspondence between the particular discourse of value that regulates the practice of consecration 
within different audiences and the socio-topographic location of the cultural producers they evaluate. 
Findings on consecration of competing professionals by different audiences in the context of the 
feature film industry are supportive of this view (Cattani et al., 2014).  
In short, there is increasing evidence that points to the role of producer or audience level 
socially derived criteria in patterning the distribution of honours in society. Yet, surprisingly no 
systematic effort has been made to theorize on the evaluative implications of the potential proximity 
between audience and producers in the underlying social structure and the intriguing conceptual 
tension that this shortcoming subsumes. The only exception to this general observation the study by 
Aadland et al. (2018) on awarding decisions in advertising contests, in which the authors demonstrate 
how audiences’ evaluative outcomes are a function of their geodesic distance from the professionals 
whose work they are invited to judge. Although Aadland et al (2018)’s approach is promising, it also 
runs into difficulties, which we attempt to overcome. It is promising because it introduces a simple 
but plausible analytical framework that leverages the unique features of the data to explore the 
evaluative repercussions of ties that cross the audience-candidate interface, so causing audience 
members and candidates to be variably distant from each other in the underlying social space. Yet, it 
is problematic because it suffers from three important limitations. First, the proposed theoretical 
framework does not account for the puzzling empirical evidence pointing to the existence of both 
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positive and negative returns of social proximity to recognition (measured as award attainment). Thus, 
the authors can only offer ex-post speculative explanations for the observed results. A second 
limitation is its sole reliance on quantitative evidence: evaluative mechanisms are inferred in the 
absence of any contextual information or socio-cognitive cues stemming from actual evaluative 
practices on the ground, including interactions among audience members. Thus, the study provides 
little insight into the actual judgmental process that audience members experience when making 
allocative choices. Third, the use of a geodesics-based measure of social distance captures only one of 
the many types of audience-candidate relationships that may cut across the screening interface in peer-
based evaluative settings, as the previous vignette on the Venice Film Festival suggests. In fact, 
Aadland et al. (2018) advocate for additional research to “further unpack the structure of this fabric, 
providing more granular measures of the different types of ‘social intercourses’ Blau (1977, p. 32) that 
may envelope the audience-candidate evaluative interface” (2018: 152). 
These observations are integrated into a general framework that builds on Aadland et al. (2018) 
work in important regards while attempting to overcome – both theoretically and empirically – its 
limitations. First, we juxtapose the Bourdieusian understanding of symbolic fields with recent insights 
on evaluative practices in cultural domains to illuminate the ambivalent nature of social evaluations in 
peer-based settings. Accordingly, we argue that at least two different accounts of the consequences of 
audience-candidate social proximity in awards allocation decisions can be extrapolated from extant 
literature on peer-based tournament rituals and social evaluation in cultural fields. As mentioned 
earlier, we label one account self-reproduction and the other intellectual distance. Self-reproduction is a 
stratifying effect: if self-reproduction dominates, then social proximity catalyzes recognition. In 
contrast, intellectual distance implies that audience members may have a negative incentive to reward 
socially proximate producers, which would occur if proximity reduces the likelihood of observing a 
patterning of recognition along relational lines. We frame the arguments separately for the sake of 
clarity, not because we think they are mutually exclusive. After introducing our framework, we attempt 
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to validate it through a combination of new qualitative insights and analytic strategy ideally suited to 
reveal the contrasting effects of social proximity on recognition not only across different types of 
proximity, but also across ordered levels of recognition intensity. Indeed, our analysis suggests that 
these two effects coexist and the observed outcome reflects the relative influence of one over the 
other at any given point in time.  
Self-reproduction 
Arguments for a positive social proximity effect can be traced to the classic Bourdieusian 
understanding of consecration rituals as a “fundamentally relational social process” (Childress, 
Rawlings, & Moeran, 2017: 51) that serves the primary purpose of facilitating and/or reinforcing the 
expression of shared meaning and understandings as reflected in the field canons (Bourdieu, 1993). 
To articulate this point, we further elaborate on two earlier observations. First, members of the 
evaluating audience are selected based on their legitimacy and power to consecrate, i.e., they are élite 
peers who received multiple awards in the past and, as such, they embody the field’s dominant 
aesthetic logics. It is important to point this out because prior literature has systematically shown that 
élite peers are especially prone to resist work that departs from the established canons given their 
vested interest in guaranteeing “the continued reproduction of the legitimacy of those who produce 
or defend the canon” (Bourdieu, 1993: 20). As Taylor (1987: 145) notes, “the formal conferring of 
honour […] is especially important for maintaining legitimacy of the élite” and reinforcing the status 
position of its members (see also Goode, 1978). In line with this view, ritual theorists emphasize that 
tournament rituals provide order to fields by encapsulating “a particular vision of reality that those 
staging it wish to impose on the social structure in which they are embedded” (Anand & Jones, 2008: 
1038). Particularly in the context of peer-based evaluative settings, such judgements “perpetuate 
accepted practices by reinforcing quality and values” (Patterson, Cavazos, & Washington, 2014: 79; 
Shymko & Roulet, 2016) that resonate with who the evaluators are and what they stand for – a process 
that Bourdieu (1988: 259) labels as “consecration through contagion.” This brings us to our second 
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observation. The collaborative networks that peers develop in the course of subsequent creative 
projects are the forum in which tastes flow and interpenetrate (Godart and Mears, 2009) – or, as 
McLean put it, they are “sites of taste convergence” (2016: 101). As Hagstrom noted long ago in his 
work on the collaborative production of culture in scientific projects, participants in these networks 
“share commitments to values, heuristics, models and exemplars” (1976: 97). That is, they tend to 
share not only particular ethical orientations but also cognitive predispositions and linguistic practices. 
Joint creative enterprises elicit bonding and encourage shared value commitments that allow the 
congealment of different visions into a unitary project identity. This is a crucial observation because 
we know from social psychological research on social identity that independence of judgment is 
“compromised by any relationship that builds a common identity” (Moore et al., 2006: 7) between 
evaluators and those evaluated, even without any conscious intention to indulge in favoritism (Tajfel 
& Turner, 1986; Thompson, 1995). Likewise, our interviews suggest that project participants do not 
merely exchange information; they produce and reinforce similar attitudes towards the field as well. 
To the extent that prizes and awards symbolize ideals – and, therefore, are part of a ranking 
process of social desirability – they are associated with actors who themselves are likely to share the 
core values of the élite through their positions in the social structure (Cattani et al., 2014). The self-
reproduction effect implies that, all else being equal, audience members will reward those projects 
whose members are more closely located to them in the underlying social structure. This point is 
forcefully present throughout Bourdieu’s treatment of consecration rituals and also implicit in 
founding statements in the field of the “New Economic Sociology,” such as Granovetter’s proposition 
that “people in all cultures seek, in varying degrees, the non-economic goals of approval status and 
power which are available only in social contexts through networks of others” (2017: 22). This 
argument also resonates with research showing that individuals are more willing to share their 
resources – in our case their prestige – with people who are just a few steps removed in their social 
network than towards more distant others (Goeree et al., 2010; Baldassarri & Grossman, 2013). Recent 
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findings on the preferential allocation of funding to projects whose members share their spatial 
location with members of the evaluating panel (Criscuolo et al., 2017) or the preferential allocation of 
attention to suggestions from external contributors with whom the organization has interacted before 
(Piezunka & Dahlander, 2015) are consistent with this idea as well. Accordingly, if the self-
reproduction effect prevails, we expect that, ceteris paribus, social proximity will catalyze recognition. 
Intellectual distance 
The self-reproduction view emphasizes the catalyzing effect of social proximity. Yet recognition-
inhibiting effects of social proximity also are present in the literature. Extensive fieldwork by Lamont 
and associates in fields of cultural production (i.e., art and science) is especially instructive as it captures 
the main sources of concerns associated with the strategic, self-serving understanding of evaluative 
practices which features so prominently in Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic fields (Heinich, 2009). 
Through in depth empirical analysis of actual evaluative processes and deliberations “on the ground” 
this line of scholarship has drawn attention to the evaluators’ self-understanding in shaping their 
actions as well as the emotional consequences of their work (Lamont, 2009; Beljean, Chong, & 
Lamont, 2015). For instance, in her study on evaluative practices in the world of scientific peer review 
Lamont and her colleagues find that peer evaluation represents “more than just an opportunity for 
panelists to […] reproduce their positions in the academic field. Panelists are driven by the desire to 
contribute to collective problem solving and through the process they derive feelings of pleasure and 
validation of their self-concepts as fair judges and experts whose opinions matter” (Beljean et al., 2015: 
42; see also Lamont, 2009). Chong (2013) reaches similar conclusions based on the qualitative analysis 
of peer-based evaluative practices in the literary field. She focuses in particular on the steps that writers 
take in their double role of authors and evaluators of fellow-peers in order to increase the legitimacy 
of their assessments and sustain their identity as impartial judges. In a follow-on study, she further 
exposes how a complex mix of competition and stewardship comes to bear on writers’ evaluative 
practices as they endeavour to distance themselves from the subject matter in order “to push their 
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judgment toward intersubjectivity […] and remove corrupting influences” from it (Chong, 2013: 278; 
Chong, 2015). It is this intersubjective quality – enabled by the pursuit of intellectual distance – that 
is foundational to the perceived legitimacy of evaluators’ judgments and thus key to avoid the potential 
“stain” of peer opinions. Writers actively reflect upon the consequences and risks of their judgments, 
and these considerations inform how they choose. These close-up empirical analyses of judgments “in 
the wild” show that peer evaluators face a mix of emotional and professional tensions amplified by 
their role-switching to which they respond by investing themselves in customary rules and practices 
that signal intellectual distance, which is an epistemic virtue characterized by intellectual autonomy.  
These customary rules refer to the taken-for-granted norms governing what is considered right 
behaviour for cultural producers engaged in evaluation in ostensibly meritocratic settings (Lamont, 
2009, 2012). The collective outcome of adhering to these rules is the perceived fairness of the 
evaluation process.  
Thus, insofar as the accomplishment of intellectual distance is a key determinant of peers’ 
evaluative orientation in meritocratic settings, producers-audience connections in the underlying social 
structure represent “contaminating” influences and, as such, should discourage judgments favourable 
to the producers within such pairs. Though perhaps counterintuitive, we believe this is a plausible 
expectation given the evaluative ambivalence that some of our informants, faced with the task of 
adjudicating among competing candidates displaying different degrees of social distance from them, 
reported to have experienced. Two related observations broadly represented in past research reinforce 
this supposition. First, the importance of the “disinterestedness” ideal for careers in cultural fields and 
the aura of authenticity associated with its pursuit. Social proximity between audience members and 
producers may nurture the suspicion that the actual motivation of the audience is not to pursue the 
disinterestedness ideal, but to further the personal interests of (some of) its members, so raising 
concerns about the audience’s moral authenticity (Hahl et al., 2017). To the extent that these concerns 
increase susceptibility to claims against audience members’ moral character, they should deter the 
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patterning of allocative choices along relational lines and thus result in the dominance of intellectual 
distance over self-reproduction. This is, in essence, the speculative interpretation that Aadland et al. 
(2018) propose in their attempt to account for the puzzling observation that the probability of 
awarding choices favoring the “connected candidates” declines as the social distance between audience 
members and producers diminishes significantly. 
Second, the public bestowal of symbolic capital not only serves the award recipient; it also 
enhances considerably the prominence of the tournament ritual that sustains the awarding rite 
(Heinich, 2009; Gallus & Frey, 2016). As tournament rituals are deliberately organized to increase the 
likelihood and appearance of fairness (Taylor, 1987) explicit reliance on relational criteria would 
jeopardize their credibility. Exchange theory treats the perceived equity of the exchange as 
fundamental to the stability of relationships. As pointed out by Taylor (1987), if honours allocated in 
the course of tournament rituals can be understood as part of an exchange process, then we should 
“expect to find formal honours allocated by achievement rather than by direct ascription” (Taylor, 
1987: 144). In summary, the previous arguments allow for the possibility that the intellectual distance 
effect may counterbalance the self-reproduction effect. Accordingly, if the intellectual distance effect 
prevails, we expect that, ceteris paribus, social proximity will deter recognition. 
As we anticipated earlier, our goal is to disentangle the relative importance of self-reproduction 
and intellectual distance by exploiting the unique features of our data along with an analytic approach 
well suited to explore how such effects vary across ordered levels of recognition. Different levels of 
recognition are indeed a distinctive feature of many tournament rituals. In the case of the Oscar, for 
example, winners are chosen from a pool of nominees. The winner then must first become part of 
the consideration set – i.e., enter the evaluating audience’s attention space – before receiving the final 
award – i.e., enter the audience’s consecration space (Cattani, Ferriani, & Lanza, 2017). If self-
reproduction prevails, then social proximity should help candidates enter not only the audience’s 
attention space (e.g., receive a nomination), but also the audience’s consecration space (i.e., win). If, 
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on the contrary, intellectual distance prevails, then social proximity may impede candidates’ entry into 
the evaluating audience’s attention and/or consecration space. 
DYNAMICS OF RECOGNITION IN THE DIGITAL ADVERTSING INDUSTRY 
Informed by mixed-methods analysis of jury deliberations within the context of digital advertising 
awards in Norway, we seek to test these two effects by focusing on three complementary facets of 
social proximity, which correspond to the three mechanisms evoked in the opening Tarantino 
vignette: prior direct ties (Coppola/Iglesia), reciprocity (Coppola /Hellman), and cliquishness (“clan” 
effect). After illustrating some important features of the awarding process in the context of the 
Norwegian advertising industry, we summarize interviews conducted with key informants that echo 
and give nuance to the two theoretical accounts presented earlier. Next, we describe our analytical 
strategy, which allows us to gain a more systematic understanding of the implications of social 
proximity for awarding choices.  
Choice of the Norwegian Digital Adverting Industry 
We examine the importance of a relational understanding of tournament rituals by focusing on 
audiences’ awards allocation choices within the context of the Norwegian digital advertising industry.  
Like in other fields of cultural production, advertising excellence is usually honored through awards 
contests (Helgesen, 1994) in which competing producers are evaluated by juries composed of peers 
who specialize in the same advertising categories as the contestants. In the area of digital advertising, 
The Silver Tag Award is one of the most prestigious award contests in Norway. Arranged by the 
Norwegian Interest Organization for Interactive Marketing (INMA) – a non-profit interest 
organization that works for the advancement and utilization of digital advertising media – The Silver 
Tag is a contest open for participation to all Norwegian advertising agencies. As the contest runs on 
a monthly basis, active professionals tend to submit their latest work on an ongoing basis, so 
participating into the contest multiple times. The multiple entry nature of the contest produces a 
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repeated game in which active professionals that are appointed jurors may happen to evaluate the 
projects of professional peers who previously served as jurors. This point notwithstanding, all jury 
members share one important characteristic: they are high status professionals who won in previous 
competitions and hence tend to be the expression of the prevailing canons in the field (Bourdieu, 
1993). To illustrate this point, during our observation period jury members on average won 10 times 
as many awards as non-jury members. 
The conservatism of the field is reflected in its extremely high degree of concentration of 
recognition. Among the 1,734 professionals who ever entered The Silver Tag contest over the 2003-
2010 period, only 299 individuals won the award one time while only 53 individuals won the award 
twice. In the tail of the distribution, only 32 individuals won 4 or more awards during this period. In 
Figure 1 we plot the award distributions for jurors and non-juror professionals on a log-log scale (with 
log of awards on the x-axis and log of the number of jurors or professionals on the y-axis). Note that 
unlike the tail of a random bell curve whose distribution thins out exponentially as it decays, the 
distributions resemble a power law. Although these distributions aggregate awards over the study 
period, they offer some hint of the prestige dynamics that shape the field, mimicking what one would 
expect from a process of stratification whereby every increase in recognition (here award attainment) 
leads to a greater chance of recognition in the future. 
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
The sociological implications of this type of distribution are highly consequential. When a relatively 
small group catalyzes a large proportion of the field’s recognition, its members gain resource and 
power advantages that accumulate over time and lead to the formation of an élite (Kadushin, 1995). 
In our study, we explore awards allocation mechanisms resulting from the underlying social structure 
in which both audience members and producers partake. This leads us to a very important feature of 
our setting that substantiates the meaning of such structure and affords its empirical tractability. 
Organized as an ecology of temporary projects, the advertising industry relies significantly on extended 
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personal networks and one-off teams (Grabher, 2002, 2004; Ferriani, Cattani, & Baden-Fuller, 2009). 
As summarized by Grabher (2002: 252) “Like jazz bands […] vary their composition of instruments 
and players from time to time […] teams in the creative realm of advertising production regroup from 
project to project.” From a network analytic point of view, the industry entry (and exit) of 
professionals as members of a project-team translates into a traceable and tractable bipartite 
collaborative structure. The links in this structure are direct ties among professionals who work on 
the same project as well as indirect ties among professionals linked by other professionals who work 
on more than one project. Both types of ties have substantial meaning because, in spite of the 
temporariness of each project, the professionals that usually form a project-team work intensely 
together to combine their diverse skills into a single, seamless production. Each project involves 
several weeks of collaborative brainstorming, storyboarding and difficult editing, as well as moments 
of celebration and commiseration that promote strong social bonds among the teammates. These ties 
form “the basic social infrastructure of project-based organizing in advertising” (Grabher, 2002: 249).  
Background: Key Informant Interviews 
We conducted several interviews to gain deeper contextual understanding of the Norwegian 
advertising field and the prestige dynamics associated to The Silver Tag tournament. One of the 
authors also followed the Norwegian advertising news press very closely during the study period and 
consulted archival materials. Our goals were to verify the role of relational dynamics in evaluative 
tasks, and ascertain how these dynamics are interpreted and enacted. We were also interested in gaining 
insights into the aesthetic criteria underlying allocation choices and their perceived role in shaping the 
field’s professional identity. The interviewees include a panel of field insiders consisting of élite 
advertising professionals, advertising professionals struggling to make their mark, advertising awards 
contest jurors, and representatives from industry associations. Specifically, we interviewed 
professionals who competed in The Silver Tag contest and past jurors. While most of our respondents 
worked for élite advertising or digital media agencies, some also worked for less prestigious agencies. 
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Finally, we interviewed the managers from the Norwegian interest organization for interactive 
marketing (INMA) that arranges “The Silver Tag” awards contest. Overall, we conducted 19 
interviews that lasted between 20 minutes and 2 hours.4 Descriptive data on the sampled agencies and 
respondents are reported in Table 1. 
< Insert Table 1 here > 
All respondents agreed that awards are a source of prestige within the Norwegian advertising field. 
The tagline used by one of the industry flagship magazines in the aftermath of The Silver Tag award’s 
institution was: “The award is going to create new heroes in the advertising industry.” Likewise, two of our 
interviewees emphasized the crucial role of the award as a source of credibility as well as power: 
“To win The Silver Tag means an enormous amount, in particular for a job where we all have put down so 
much work…(winning) proves that we have achieved something we have worked hard for, and that is to deliver 
at a high level in everything we do regardless of how big or small the task is.” 
 
There is no single factor other than those awards that I can think of that suddenly makes somebody very 
attractive and that moves them from one agency to another at any cost […] What gives power and influence 
here? There is no getting around it; those awards matter a lot… There is no doubt that it makes everything 
much easier for you as a professional in the profession in all possible ways... Winning awards… is the most 
important parameter for your personal career development, salary, status, everything.”  
 
These awards not only shape individual careers but also signal stylistic standards at the field level, 
reflecting precise position takings and symbolic demarcation efforts. For instance, in the course of 
our interviews, some interviewees pointed to the existence of a clear distinction between an élite and 
the rest, a distinction that appears to mirror a “magical division” (Bourdieu, 1984: 6) between the 
official canon and everything else (Braden, 2009; DiMaggio, 1982). There was also a consensus about 
the tendency of juries to reify this division through conventional choices based on a canonical 
understanding of what a good idea is supposed to look like. When asked about the criteria for judging 
quality, interviewees often invoked the idea of conservatism and reproduction of established 
categories. Two, in particular, noted: 
                                                          
4 Topics included collaborative practices, meaning and relevance of awards, evaluation criteria, perceptions of distance or 
proximity in the social space, personal anecdotal evidence of jury decisions and deliberation processes. 
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“What characterizes a good idea… is formula oriented. It’s been like that for many years. Ideas they you 
recognize are formula ideas. There are certain ideas that win…and they are quite similar... That says something 
about conservatism in the juries. If you see something you are not familiar with, and you don’t know whether 
it’s good or bad because you just get a strange feeling…then it’s difficult to discuss it. When it’s easy to discuss 
it…it’s easier to get it through because of the confidence of those present.”  
 
Those awards… are not catalyzers for thinking in new ways. They are catalyzers for clinging to old ways of 
looking at things, old formulas and old categories.” 
 
Unsurprisingly and consistently with established cumulative advantage arguments, when we probed 
the basis of these tendencies towards self-reproduction various informants stressed the existence of 
“status beliefs”—beliefs that are discussed as valid in public displays of honor, and which rank 
individuals, organizations, or objects according to their expected ability to contribute to valued 
outcomes (Ridgeway, 2014). Advertising professionals expect prestigious colleagues to create work of 
better quality and this expectation creates an evaluative advantage. As one of our interviewees with 
significant jury experience put it: 
“It’s always much easier to win if you have won before … because jury members are humans that make choice 
based on experience. And it’s a bit like that [well-known creative teams] have a tendency to score incredibly 
well on work that is really only average. And that is because you are positively biased… You really want that 
the work they do is of high quality.” 
 
Interestingly, several of the interviewees went a long way in characterizing the inner workings of the 
jury as “professional,” “fair,” “impartial,” “made with best intentions” and cautiously designed to 
avoid any favorable treatment.5 Some even framed the decision of accepting an invitation to be part 
of the Jury as a matter of authenticity, invoking the disavowal of personal calculus as foundational to 
their evaluative culture and to their moral role as custodians of the industry’s unique professional 
ethos. Yet, despite rules and procedures that aim to reduce possible conflicts of interest, most former 
members of the jury we interviewed openly admitted experiencing an ambivalent mix of professional 
and emotional tensions amplified by their “double hat” of being evaluators as well as peer producers, 
that caused them to actively reflect upon the consequences of their judgments. As one of the jurors 
                                                          
5 For more details on how the jury evaluation process is designed to ensure procedural fairness, please see the Appendix. 
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summarized, there are personal risks and benefits that inform a juror’s decision because “you are saying 
something about yourself when you declare who deserves gold. You expose yourself.”  
On the one hand, throughout our interview industry participants appear keenly aware of the 
fact that jury deliberations are enveloped into “interpersonal patterns of value commitments” that – 
as one of them put it – inevitably channel attention, energy and information, subtly shaping 
attributions of ability. For instance, when asked about the evaluative implications of juries composed 
of individuals with prior experience working in project-teams together with contest participants, 
interviewees routinely invoked the possibility of relationship-driven preferential allocation processes. 
One of them in particular, an account manager, was very explicit about this point:  
“If two projects are equally good, then the project where project members and jurors know each other will win 
[…] it is that these people share the same opinion about what is “important” and “not important”, as well as 
what is “right” and not “right.” They (the projects by candidates previously tied to the jurors) might therefore 
score higher on the criteria valued by the jurors who ‘administer the truth’ about what is good and not so good.”   
 
A senior copywriter and frequent juror with more than 20 years of experience described his experience 
in the industry as somewhat similar to being a member of a “gang” to convey the sense of belonging 
and commonality in aesthetic preferences elicited by intense patterns of direct and indirect interaction. 
Another interviewee echoed this point by characterizing the industry as cliquish, due to a combination 
of small numbers, interpersonal acquaintance and frequent interaction: 
“The Norwegian advertising industry is small…you meet the same people time and time again. It is therefore 
unavoidable that it becomes cliquish. Project members and jurors who know or who … [know about] each 
other are part of this cliquishness.” 
 
Likewise, one copy writer hinted at one preferential-allocation process based on some sort of mutual 
support, what he referred to as “camaraderie”: 
“I am convinced that good old-fashioned camaraderie plays a big part, not in terms of explicit bargaining, but 
more as an implied and continuous levelling of ‘some for all’ – within a circle of people who know each other.” 
On the other hand, our interviews also unearthed a fundamental evaluative ambivalence caused by 
actors’ strong susceptibility to claims against their authenticity. Avoiding conflicts of interests may in 
fact be a matter of moral conviction or adherence to epistemic values. Juries’ compositions are in the 
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public domain; likewise, the existence of professional relationships between members of the jury and 
candidate producers is relatively visible to other members of the industry, as professionals have a 
rather good sense of who has worked with whom. Lurking suspicions of deliberations along these 
relational lines can therefore easily surface and undermine personal reputations, even if the jury 
members genuinely endorse those deliberations. This type of occurrence can sometimes render a jury 
member’s proximity to a candidate more of a liability than an advantage. One of our informants, 
reflecting upon the painful experience of finding himself in a jury where voicing his genuine 
preferences for a particular project could raise reputational concerns due to his prior collaborations 
with some members of that project-team, noted: 
 “It is a big problem if they (i.e., the members of the industry) come to believe you have a vested interest. If you 
favour that project […] you may end up in big trouble. I usually keep quiet or alternatively try to mention 
what is good about other projects in such situations.”  
 
One copywriter, referring to a stint with the jury a few years earlier, described facing a similar dilemma 
due to his acquaintance with one of the contestants. He stressed the risks of being perceived as biased, 
which can hurt one’s status and therefore require factoring into one’s final decision the personal 
consequences of alternative outcomes:  
“… you have to be careful […] To sit in juries is an ungrateful job because you may get a lot of criticism.”  
 
There are two summary points worth making about these professionals’ observations. First, due to 
the role switch structure of peer-evaluative settings actors my face a particularly acute problem of 
consistency between their “frontstage” and “backstage” (Goffman, 1959). This may lead to a general 
authenticity concern: do the jurors perform their role for the sake of implicit personal gains rather 
than the epistemic values and standards that govern what is considered appropriate behaviour for 
those engaged in evaluation?  Without a window into an actor’s backstage, the existence of implicit 
personal interests will elicit suspicion on the actor’s inauthenticity and thus threaten her reputation. 
Second, issues of aesthetic merit (“We want to stretch ourselves after the pursuit of aesthetic ideals”) 
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seem to coexist with concerns about the personal implications that awarding choices yield (“You 
expose yourself”) resulting in conflicting emotions and professional dissonance.  
In sum, the image that emerges from our qualitative immersion into the advertising field 
appears to mirror the general understanding of tournament rituals as means of symbolic demarcation, 
but it also reveals how emotional considerations (i.e., competition and stewardship, empathy alongside 
self-preservation as well as feelings of validation jury members derive from their self-understanding 
as fair judges) all come to bear on audiences’ evaluative practices. Table 2 reports some of the most 
representative quotes evoking the two perspectives that shape these practices. For, however one 
conceives of them, audience members’ evaluations of advertising projects do not occur in a social 
vacuum. Not only are audiences cognizant of producers’ identities, which then results in well-known 
status-driven attributions, but their judgments flow across peer-based relationships of mutual 
acquaintance and recognition that render jury members and producers variably proximate to each 
other. These judgments arise in social settings that can be conceptualized as networks of interpersonal 
loyalties, reciprocity and influence, and so can be depicted using the vocabulary of network theory and 
analytic tools – to which we now turn.   
< Insert Table 2 here > 
ANALYTIC STRATEGY 
To unpack the role of social proximity in shaping the level of recognition in the context of the 
Norwegian adverting industry, our analytical strategy is to focus on three distinct but complementary 
variables at the jury-project level that capture as many facets of social proximity: direct ties, 
cliquishness and reciprocity. While direct ties and cliquishness reflect socio-structural features of 
proximity, reciprocity rests on socio-cognitive considerations. The first variable – direct ties – hinges 
on the most basic definition of social proximity, i.e., simple adjacency in a network, whereby two 
actors are proximate if and only if they are directly tied (Marsden & Friedkin, 1993). In our setting, 
this tie exists whenever a member of the jury has prior experience working with a member of the 
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project under evaluation. While the most restrictive structural definition of social proximity is simple 
adjacency in a network, generalizations of adjacency – as measure of social proximity – retain the idea 
that actors are proximate to the extent that they are jointly located in structurally cohesive regions of 
the network. Thus, our second variable – cliquishness – focuses on how audiences’ evaluations of 
producers’ work may be affected by their being jointly located in structurally cohesive regions of the 
network, i.e., clans. Network-analytic literature on social capital suggests that network cohesion is 
likely to divide actors into insiders and outsiders. According to Bourdieu, members of a cohesive social 
group develop a specific habitus, which is socialized, shared, and maintained (often unconsciously). 
The habitus imparts the “feel for the game” (Blair, 2009: 121) and makes membership visible, creating 
distinctive features that signal belonging or exclusion. Reciprocity, or the giving of gifts to another in 
return for gifts received (Schwartz, 1967), is a socio-cognitive measure of social proximity. It stems 
from the understanding of the formal conferring of honour which can be inferred from Goode’s 
(1978) seminal work, namely that honours received may increase the recipient’s sense of allegiance to 
the award giver thereby increasing her/his perceived closeness to the latter (see also Taylor, 1987). As 
summarized by Sherry (1983: 158), “The giving of gifts can be used to shape and reflect social 
integration (i.e., membership in a group) or social distance (i.e., relative intimacy of relationships).” 
Focusing on these three dimensions of social proximity allows us to establish whether social 
proximity catalyzes or inhibits recognition. To this end, it is important to clarify that recognition is 
not a dichotomous variable, but rather can be present in widely varying amounts that, in our context, 
range from no placement, to receiving an honorable mention, to winning an award. Besides identifying 
the winner, in fact, the jury has the “opportunity to bestow an honorable mention to work that in its 
opinion it has solved or contributed something in a very good way, to which it is desirable to grant 
extra attention” (www.inma.no). Less prestigious than an award, an honorable mention still has the 
effect of identifying work that deserves esteem and attention in the eyes of the evaluating audience. 
Because of this layered pattern of recognition, audience decisions’ outcomes vary in their saliency as 
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they serve to separate the “great from the merely good” (Allen & Lincoln, 2004: 874): unlike less 
defining forms of recognition (bestowing an honorable mention), consecration decisions (bestowing 
an award) tend to catalyze greater public attention and even face public scrutiny. This observation 
affords a window into a more granular analysis of the conditions under which self-reproduction and 
intellectual distance operate. Examining the previous three articulations of social proximity and their 
impact on evaluative outcomes, however, poses several empirical challenges. It requires complete 
information on the full set of producers struggling for recognition, and such data are rare. In addition, 
information about the relationships between audience members and producers is difficult to obtain. 
Tracking these relationships through prior joint experience – the approach pursued here – further 
requires detailed information on the career histories of both audience members and producers. Finally, 
the true quality of cultural producers’ offers is typically unobservable and difficult to infer 
unequivocally even after consumption. The challenge, therefore, is to adopt an approach that enables 
the researcher to ascertain the presence of relational effects independent of the true quality of the 
producer’s offer. Below we discuss how we addressed each of these challenges and provide 
operationalization details for each of the three social proximity measures we selected.  
Data 
To identify organizations and professionals competing for symbolic recognition in the Norwegian 
digital advertising field, we used data on all projects entered into “The Silver Tag” – the monthly 
Norwegian digital advertising awards contest – from May 2003 to April 2010. The data were originally 
collected by Aadland (2012; 2013) from the online “The Silver Tag” archive published by INMA. We 
strengthened this data by collecting all missing data for some of the project participants. While, in fact, 
most of the firms submitted their projects indicating the names of all project participants, some firms 
did not. To address this shortcoming one of the co-authors contacted each agency by email or by 
phone to retrieve the names of these producers. In the process, we also double-checked the names 
we had collected directly from the archive published by INMA and corrected any inconsistency with 
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the help of people from the advertising agencies. As a result, the dataset is truly unique. The data 
comprise a total of 1,734 distinct individuals, 350 distinct organizations and 902 projects over a total 
of 75 contest months.6 Unlike the usual award scheme practice of reporting winners and/or nominees 
only, the data contain the losers as well. Thus, the data enable comparisons between winners and 
losers as well as comparisons between previously consecrated and non-consecrated producers.7 We 
collected data on all jury members in “The Silver Tag” awards contest from May 2003 to March 2010 
from “The Silver Tag” website and industry press. Each jury served from May to April in the following 
year during the years 2003-2006 and from April to March during the years 2006-2010. In total, we 
collected data on 7 juries, whose size over the study period varied from 4 (for the first jury) to 11 (for 
the last jury) members. 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable measures the outcome of an evaluation process where jury members must 
decide whether to bestow an accolade (honourable mention or award) on projects selected from 
among the larger set of projects eligible in a given contest month. We coded the dependent variable 0 
if a project did not receive any accolade; 1 if a project received an honourable mention; 2  if a project 
reached the 1st place (i.e., won the award).8 The dependent variable, therefore, is categorical and 
ordered in terms of levels, or intensity, of peer recognition. As mentioned earlier, this ordered 
structure affords a nuanced window into the influence of social proximity on recognition: receiving 
                                                          
6 June/July each year was combined into one contest generation by the Norwegian interactive marketing interest 
organization responsible for the contest, INMA. In addition, INMA combined March/April 2004 and August/September 
2004 into two distinct contest generations. This practice produces a total of 11 competitions per year – without counting 
the aforementioned exceptions in 2004. 
7 In two contest months, August 2005 and May 2006, no projects were deemed worthy to win. 
8 Although jurors further rank honorable mentions from 5th up to 2nd place, we preferred to collapse them into the single 
‘honorable mention’ category. Based on our field interviews, the placement makes no significant difference and the really 
meaningful comparison is between no placement, honorable mention and award won. This level of recognition mirrors 
the way the accolades are announced through The Silver Tag press releases, where the winning project figures prominently 
with a description of the jury’s deliberation, and an interview with the head of the jury and a representative of the 
advertising agency for which the winners work. A picture of the winning team typically accompanies the press release. The 
projects that receive an honorable mention also feature in the press release but are only briefly mentioned at the bottom. 
Given the econometric approach used in the analysis, collapsing honorable mentions into a single category also facilitates 
the interpretation of the results (Williams, 2016). 
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an honorable mention means that a project enters the evaluating audience’s attention space, while 
winning an award (i.e., moving from a weak to a strong form of recognition) means that a project 
enters the audience’s consecration space. 
Independent variables 
Direct Ties. We capture the first manifestation of social proximity by looking at the impact of 
direct ties between audience members and candidates on the likelihood of receiving an accolade. We 
computed this variable by first generating bipartite project affiliation network matrices based on the 
monthly “The Silver Tag” digital awards contest using Ucinet, version 6 for Windows (Borgatti, 
Everett, & Freeman, 2002). A well-known issue in establishing the existence of a social connection is 
how long this connection should persist. Assuming no relationship decay over the study period would 
imply an overestimate of the number and duration of connections in the network by maintaining false 
ties to inactive professionals. However, given the fast-pace nature of the industry and, in particular, 
after our interviews with industry participants, it was unclear whether a professional not involved in 
any advertising projects for about 2 years should still be considered an active member of the industry. 
Accordingly, we created our adjacency matrices adopting a 24-month moving window that was 
updated monthly.9 Using these matrices, we then calculated the nearness between each individual 
advertising project member and the peer jury members. Because our unit of analysis is the project, we 
created the variable direct ties by counting only the number of jurors with direct ties to project members. 
Reciprocity. An important condition for the emergence of reciprocal behavior is the repetition 
of the exchange situation which allows actors to decide whether or not to reciprocate for benefits 
received in previous exchanges (Axelrod, 1984). In our setting, for instance, producers might one day 
become judges and therefore be asked to evaluate the work of former jury members who evaluated 
their work in previous awards competitions. Accordingly, we created the reciprocity variable that 
                                                          
9 Adopting a shorter (one year) or longer (3 years) moving time window yields very similar results. 
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captures the extent to which jury members reward project whose members were jurors in the past and 
who – in that role – had rewarded one or more of the current jury members. For each project, in other 
words, the measure tallies the number of current jurors who won or received an honorable mention 
by project members serving as jurors over the previous two years and whose work happened to be 
under evaluation during the focal contest month. 
 Cliquishness. As pointed out by Marsden and Friedkin (1993: 131), generalizations of social 
proximity “permit two actors to be proximate, while not directly tied, if they are connected by numerous 
short connections via intermediaries” (emphasis added). This idea can best be appreciated by referring 
to Figure 2. As illustrated, nodes 1 and 2 can be jointly located in the same cohesive set, despite not 
being directly connected (sub A); or they can be directly connected without necessarily being members 
of the same cohesive subset (sub B). Note that due to the project-based structure of collaborations, 
at any given point in time audience members and producers can simultaneously be members of more 
than one cohesive subset. Thus, cohesiveness is not merely a dichotomous state resulting from joint 
location in a structurally cohesive regions of the network but may vary dramatically depending on the 
number of mutually interpenetrating cohesive structures that audiences and producers share, that is, 
how cliquishly interconnected they are. In order to capture the degree of cliquishness, the strict clique 
definition (maximal fully-connected sub-graph) is extremely strong for many purposes. It requires 
every member of a sub-group to have a direct tie with each and every other member. A more common 
approach is to allow for cliques where members are not so tightly connected. For instance, one could 
define an actor as a member of a clique if this actor is connected to every other member of the group 
at a distance greater than 1. This approach to defining sub-structures is called n-clique (Hanneman & 
Riddle, 2005). The n-clique criterion specifies that the maximum geodesic distance or path length 
between any dyad cannot exceed n. For example, a 2-clique is one in which the members are connected 
either directly (distance 1) or indirectly through a common neighbor (distance 2). Yet, even in a 2-
clique, the distance 2 path that connects any dyad might still run through a non-member of the clique. 
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In other words, the diameter of the clique – i.e., “the path distance between its most distant members” 
(Scott, 2000: 117) – may be greater than the value of n used to define the clique. Some researchers, 
therefore, propose a relatively minor modification on the n-clique approach, called n-clan, which 
requires that all the ties among actors occur through other members of the group (Hanneman & 
Riddle, 2005). An n-clan is an n-clique in which (a) all actors are connected by paths of length ≤ n, and 
(b) every node is also a member of the n-clique (Wasserman & Faust, 1994; Scott, 2000). In the paper, 
we chose a value of n equal to 2 for the identification of clique members: this gives the smallest group 
size which is to be considered a 2-clan.  
< Insert Figure 2 here> 
To compute our cliquishness variable, we first computed the n-clan measure for each juror-professional 
dyad over the 24-month moving window that was updated monthly using Ucinet, version 6 for 
Windows (Borgatti et al., 2002). This measure indicates whether a juror and a professional are both 
members of the same clan (as defined earlier). For each project, we computed the median of the n-
clan values of the professionals working on the same project. The variable thus measures to what 
extent jury and project members competing in a given monthly contest also partake in the same clan. 
Control variables 
To rule out alternative explanations, we included several control variables in our models.10 
Project quality. The main empirical challenge to estimate the actual effects of social proximity is 
to control for the quality of the project under evaluation. In cultural fields, social evaluations are only 
marginally based on an objective observation of quality. For this reason, evaluators focus on the 
elements they can directly associate with the quality they are trying to assess (Shymko & Roulet, 2016). 
The advertising field insiders we interviewed suggested that, during our observation window, projects 
of high quality were likely to exhibit certain measurable attributes besides the un-measurable 
                                                          
10 Except for the project quality measure, all controls are consistent with those used in Aadland et al. (2018). 
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idiosyncratic aspects of the creative idea underlying each project. First, higher quality projects tended 
to be technologically advanced and innovative in terms of technological application.11 Second, high 
quality projects were usually the result of inter-firm collaborations through which specialized technical 
knowledge and resources were combined. The likelihood of observing social ties between jury 
members and producers also increases with the size of the project, i.e., the number of individuals 
working on the same project. Although other unobserved characteristics might affect project quality, 
the technical sophistication of a project and the number of people working on it represent a reasonably 
good approximation of a project’s underlying quality. 
Based on these insights from field insiders, we thus generated the variables project sophistication, 
joint project and project size as proxies for these general characteristics of high quality projects. To measure 
project sophistication, we generated a variable that differentiates projects based on the type of technologies 
that they employed. The variable tallies the number of agencies specializing in 3D-animation, film 
production, radio production, or back-end streaming involved in a given project. Although this 
variable does not capture the actual manner in which the technologies are applied, it discriminates 
projects for which the producers had the opportunity to leverage those technologies from projects for 
which this opportunity was unavailable. In other words, the variable captures the ‘potential’ technical 
sophistication of a project. Also, the variable does not simply reflect jury members’ perceived level of 
sophistication, which then reduces the risk that purely subjective considerations might be driving jury 
members’ decisions. We measured joint project as inter-firm collaboration at the project level by creating 
a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the project was created by two or more firms, and 0 
if the project was created by one single firm. Lastly, we measured project size as the total number of 
individuals on each advertising project. In this respect, a larger number of project participants serves 
                                                          
11 In the early years of digital advertising, the technological constraints on creative digital advertising solutions were 
considerable because downloading speed was slow. As a result, creative work in digital advertising was mostly limited to 
relatively static, low resolution, banner advertisements. With the diffusion of broadband technology and increasing 
downloading speeds, the opportunity space for creating digital advertising solutions expanded. In particular, digital 
advertising professionals seized the opportunity to create more sophisticated solutions involving visually appealing 
interactive content based on video/film, sound, 3D animation and streaming technologies. 
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as a proxy for larger project budgets and a higher number of hours available in the project to create 
ambitious high effort solutions. We generated our project quality variable by estimating a single-factor 
measurement model based on our three proxy variables for project quality using the SEM command 
in Stata 14. The variables yielded positive and highly significant factor loadings on the latent project 
quality factor. The project size factor loading was 9.908 and p<.000, the project sophistication factor loading 
was .896 and p<.000, while the joint project factor was constrained to 1. Finally, we obtained our project 
quality variable by calculating the predicted values for the latent project quality factor. 
Status. Previous research has used network centrality to measure status (for a review see Sauder 
Lynn, & Podolny, 2012). While awards reflect social esteem and respect, i.e., some form of public 
valuation, centrality pertains to a position of importance in a network. Accordingly, we created the 
status variable using Bonacich beta-centrality (Bonacich, 1987). The measure counts the number of 
individuals in the project with a Bonacich beta-centrality above the median in the global “Silver Tag” 
network over the total number of individuals working on the same project in a particular month 
contest based on a 24-month moving affiliation network window (see below). We also chose a more 
conservative cutoff to define high-status professionals – i.e., values greater than .85 (for a similar 
approach see Jensen 2008) – which yielded very similar results. 
Prior positive co-experience. Some jurors may have collaborated with candidates on projects in 
the past and won with them. Such prior positive co-experience may represent a source of positive 
disposition when the juror in question casts her votes over the competing candidates. Previous social 
network research has shown how social ties can be a source of social benefits (e.g., more favorable 
evaluations) or social liabilities (e.g., less favorable evaluations) depending on whether relationships 
between evaluators and candidates are positive or negative (Labianca & Brass, 2006). Insofar as prior 
interactions have resulted in the achievement of a positive outcome they are likely to affect evaluators’ 
disposition towards the work of their past collaborators. We therefore identified The Silver Tag 
projects in which a current candidate and juror collaborated and won the award during the prior 24 
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months. We created the indicator variable prior positive co-experience for which we assigned a value of 1 
if there were one or more such instances for a given project and 0 if there were no such instances. 
Median experience. Project members’ past experience with digital advertising projects might 
account for their differential ability to contribute to the project as well as understand what exactly jury 
members are looking for in a project. We then tallied the number of projects prior to the focal project 
that each producer entered into The Silver Tag contest. For each project, we then calculated the median 
experience of all producers involved. 
Conflict of interest. Jurors with a conflict of interest are not allowed to partake in the evaluation 
of a particular project. Two cases that INMA contemplates as conflict of interest are: a) project and 
jury members work for the same firm, and b) jurors are members of projects they are supposed to 
evaluate. To control for effect of these situations on jury deliberations, we generated an indicator 
variable that is equal to 1 if one or more project members had a colleague in the jury or a juror was a 
member of the project, and 0 otherwise. It is worth noting that the variable does not measure prior 
collaborations but only employment in the same firm or focal project co-membership. 
Competitive intensity. The larger the number of projects competing for recognition in a given 
contest month, the more intense the competition and the lower the likelihood that a given project will 
win. We therefore counted the number of projects competing for recognition in each contest month 
to control for project concentration. 
MODEL 
Given our interest in modelling ordered levels of recognition (i.e., from no placement, to honorable 
mention, to award won), the ordered logit model specification would seem the appropriate choice. 
The ordered logit model is based on the assumption that there is a latent continuous outcome variable 
and that the observed ordinal outcome arises from discretizing the underlying continuum into j-
ordered groups. This implies that all of the corresponding coefficients (except the intercepts), 
regardless of which of the collapsed logistic regressions is estimated, are the same across the different 
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logistic regressions, other than differences caused by sampling variability (Williams, 2006). Only the 
intercepts are allowed to vary across levels or categories of the outcome variable, thus generating a 
series of parallel lines with constant slope but different intercepts. That is why the ordered logit model 
is also known as the proportional odds model. Brant (1990) devised a test that is commonly used to 
assess whether the observed deviations from what the proportional odds model predicts are larger 
than what could be attributed to chance alone. Since the assumptions of the ordered logit model are 
frequently violated, generalized ordered logit odds models are sometimes a superior alternative as they 
are less restrictive than proportional odds models and more parsimonious than other methods (e.g., 
the multinomial logit model) that ignore the ordering of categories altogether. The generalized ordered 
logit, in fact, “selectively relaxes the assumptions of the ordered logit model only as needed, potentially 
producing results that do not have the problems of the ordered logit model while being almost as easy 
to interpret” (Williams, 2016: 7). More crucially, in the generalized ordered logit model both the 
intercepts and the slopes of the explanatory variables are allowed to vary across the different categories 
of the outcome variable. For instance, if the outcome variable has three possible values (like in our 
case), the model will have two sets of coefficients as two equations are estimated simultaneously. The 
model then compares all categories greater than the current category to those less than or equal to the 
current category. In our case, the original ordinal variable (i.e., no placement, honorable mention, 
award won) is collapsed into two categories and a series of binary logistic regressions are estimated 
clustering for a given contest-month. First, it is category 0 (no placement) versus categories 1 and 2 
(honorable mention and award won); then it is categories 0 and 1 (no placement and honorable 
mention) versus categories 2 (award won). In each dichotomization the lower values are, in effect, 
recoded to 0, while the higher values are recoded to 1. A positive coefficient means that higher values 
of the explanatory variable (e.g., direct ties) are associated with higher category levels of the outcome 
variable (e.g., honorable mention or award won) than the category level under consideration (e.g., no 
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placement), while negative coefficients mean that higher levels in the explanatory value increase the 
likelihood of being in the current or a lower category.  
We assessed the proportionality assumption of the proportional odds model in our data using 
the Brant test. The test provides a global test of whether any variable is significant in the model, as 
well as a specific significance test for each explanatory variable separately. Based on the test, the 
variables reciprocity and cliquishness violated the assumption. The other variable of interest, i.e., direct ties, 
did not violate the assumption but, for theoretical reasons (our interest in gauging the relative influence 
of the self-reproduction and intellectual distance explanations), we decided to allow it to vary across 
categories of the outcome variable.12 Accordingly, we estimated partially constrained generalized 
ordered logit models (Williams, 2006) by imposing constraints for parallel lines for all controls and 
allowing the variables of theoretical interest to vary across categories. This is a key feature of the 
model, which makes it particularly appealing to our goals.  Indeed, by allowing the slopes of the 
explanatory variables to vary across the different categories of the outcome variable, it is possible to 
establish whether the effect of social proximity changes as the intensity of implied recognition varies 
too; whether, in other words, a project is likely to enter the evaluating audience’s attention space (no 
placement vs. honorable mention/award won) or consecration space (no placement/honorable 
mention vs. award won) for higher values of (each dimension of) social proximity. We estimated our 
models with the gologit2 command in Stata 14. We report significance levels based on Huber-White 
robust standard errors to control for any residual heteroscedasticity. We also clustered projects on 
jury, but the results were qualitatively similar to those reported here (see below). 
 
 
                                                          
12 Our decision is consistent with Williams’ (2016: 19) suggestion that “the researcher must somehow decide which 
variables should have the proportional odds constraint imposed and which should not. Ideally, researchers should have 
strong theoretical rationales to guide them. But since such theory rarely exists, empirical means are often used instead.” 
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RESULTS 
The descriptive statistics and correlations for our measures are presented in Table 3. We first checked 
the correlations among all independent and control variables and found no evidence of 
multicollinearity. The condition number (Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 1980) for the matrix of independent 
variables was 5.30. This value and the singular values – which range between 1 and 5.30 – were all well 
below the suggested threshold of 30. The low condition numbers confirm that multicollinearity is not 
an issue in our models. Because the conflict of interest and prior positive co-experience control variables are 
highly correlated (.50) and also highly correlated with direct ties, we further checked whether the main 
results were affected when we entered each variable separately: the results were not affected. 
The results for the partially constrained generalized ordered logit model are presented in Table 
4. We first estimated a model with robust standard errors in which we entered the three variables of 
theoretical interest – i.e., direct ties, reciprocity, and cliquishness – separately, without imposing constraints 
for parallel lines. Their coefficients, therefore, are allowed to vary across categories of the dependent 
variable. The model stratifies by contest month, i.e., each stratum corresponds to a choice set for the 
jury in a particular month, and produces two sets of coefficients for each of the unconstrained variable. 
In Model 1 of Table 4, the coefficient for direct ties in the first cumulative logit model (panel 0) was 
.513 (p<.01), while in the second model (panel 1) was .406 (p<.01). The results indicate that as the 
number of jurors with direct ties to project members increases the odds that a project will receive an 
honorable mention or win an award will also increase compared to the case of no placement (category 
0); similarly, as the number of direct ties increase the odds of winning an accolade relative to the case 
of no placement/honorable mention will increase as well (panel 1). In Model 2, the coefficient for 
reciprocity was 7.484 (p<.01) for the first cumulative logit model (panel 0) and .359 (p<.01) for the 
second model (panel 1). In Model 3, the coefficient for cliquishness was positive (.128) and significant 
(p<.05) for the first cumulative logit model (panel 0), but negative (-12.079) and significant (p<.01), 
for the second (panel 1). Next, we introduced our control variables as shown in Model 4 of Table 4. 
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Since these variables do not violate the proportional odds assumption, they are not allowed to vary 
across different categories of the outcome variable. That is why we obtain only one coefficient 
estimate for each control. Specifically, the coefficients of status, project quality, median experience and 
competitive intensity were significant and in the expected direction. The coefficients for conflict of interest 
and prior positive co-experience were not statistically significant. 
After all controls were included, the coefficient for direct ties remained highly significant (p<.01) 
and positive (.247) for the first cumulative logit model (panel 0) of Model 5. However, it was positive 
but not significant in the second cumulative logit model (panel 1). Higher levels of direct ties help to 
enter into the attention space of the jury members (i.e., moving from no placement to being at the 
risk of receiving an accolade) but do not increase the likelihood of entering into the consecration space 
(i.e., winning an award). The coefficient for reciprocity was positive and highly significant for both 
cumulative logit models – i.e., 7.084 (p<.01) in panel 0, and .190 (p<.01) in panel 1, respectively – even 
after controlling for the same set of variables (Model 6). As reported in Model 7, the coefficient for 
cliquishness was positive (.280) and highly significant (p<.01) in the first cumulative logit model (panel 
0), but negative (-10.419) and highly significant (p<.01) in the second model (panel 1). This change in 
the coefficient sign suggests that higher levels of cliquishness help producers to gain some recognition 
(an honorable mention) but prevent them from further progressing towards consecration. When the 
three variables of theoretical interest were included together, the previous basic patterns were 
confirmed (Model 8). To tease out the relative differences in magnitude of the coefficients of the 
variables of interest in the full model (Model 8), we calculated the percentage point increase/decrease 
in the probability of moving levels of the dependent variable for 1 standard deviation (SD) increase 
in the independent variables. In particular, a 1 SD increase in project quality increases the probability by 
60.05 percentage points, while status increases the probability by 20.38 percentage points. By contrast, 
competitive intensity decreases the probability by 47.41 percentage points. In panel 0, a 1 SD increase in 
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direct ties increases the probability by 28.94 percentage points, reciprocity by 826.73 percentage points,13 
and cliquishness by 12.86 percentage points. In panel 1, a 1 SD increase in reciprocity increases the 
probability by 24.48 percentage points, while cliquishness decreases the probability by 630.28 percentage 
points. Finally, Model 9 in Table 5 reports the results for the full model when we clustered on jury: 
the main patterns of Model 8 were confirmed.  
<Insert Tables 3, 4 and 5 here > 
In summary, despite finding strong support for the catalyzing effect of social proximity, the results 
further indicate that the intellectual distance effect is also at work: projects whose members are directly 
connected to jury members tend to receive some level of recognition (an honourable mention), but 
do not necessarily win an award. More precisely, the finding that direct ties to jury members are helpful 
to enter into the evaluating audience’s attention space is consistent with arguments pointing to the 
impact of self-reproduction on the preferential allocation of symbolic capital. On the other hand, the 
finding that direct ties do not increase the odds of entering into the evaluating audience’s consecration 
space – i.e., moving from a weak form of recognition (honourable mention) to a strong one (winning 
an award) – is consistent with arguments invoking intellectual distance. Likewise, to the extent that 
producers and jurors are also members of a tightly knit clique (i.e., a clan), projects have a greater 
chance of entering into the jurors’ attention space (in accordance with self-reproduction arguments), 
but less likely to win an award. This negative effect of cliquishness for higher levels of recognition 
reflects the greater self-monitoring typical of tightly knit cliques or communities: cohesive 
relationships do in fact provide for the rapid dissemination of information about unethical behaviour. 
As Brass et al. (1998) noted, if actors are “all connected each can easily monitor the behaviour of the 
others, and any noted unethical behaviour by one will be transmitted quickly … Thus, surveillance is 
high and loss of reputation is swift” (p. 21). Following the logic of this argument, we interpret this 
finding as evidence supporting the influence of intellectual distance. The effect of reciprocity, though 
                                                          
13 This large increase reflects the very small range of variation of the reciprocity variable. 
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varying in magnitude, remains significant across categories of the dependent variable: jurors are more 
likely to reward projects in which producers who rewarded them in the past are also involved. This 
further implies that self-reproduction tends to prevail over intellectual distance when reciprocity 
considerations shape jury members’ decisions. Unlike the strong self-monitoring feature of 
cliquishness, the dynamic of reciprocity is more elusive and, therefore, less easily detectable by 
audience members.14 
<Insert Figures 3, 4 and 5 here> 
Boundaries of the Self-Reproduction and Intellectual Distance Effects  
The previous analysis suggests that self-reproduction tends to prevail over intellectual distance but the 
two coexist. With this core result in place, we further explored the conditions under which self-
reproduction and intellectual distance operate. First, in light of the previous results, we expect the 
strength of a tie between jury and project members to amplify the effect of direct ties across levels of 
recognition. Accordingly, we looked at whether project members collaborated only once or repeatedly 
with the same jury members in the past and re-estimated the full model including a variable that 
captures the strength of the relationship between them. The tie strength variable was positive (.645) 
and significant (p<.05) for the first panel (contrasting categories 0 vs. categories 1 and 2), but non-
significant for the second panel (contrasting categories 0 and 1 vs. category 2), confirming the basic 
pattern observed for direct ties. We also checked whether having prior positive experiences affects the 
                                                          
14 To further explore the differences in magnitude between our variables of interest and illustrate the substantive 
significance of the findings, we calculated the conditional marginal effect (Williams, 2012) for direct ties, reciprocity, and 
cliquishness. A marginal effect, or partial effect, typically measures the effect on y of a change in one of the regressors on 
the conditional mean (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). We calculated the marginal effect for each variable of interest with the 
variables in the full model at their means to reflect a typical project in our sample. Figure 3 shows that the conditional 
marginal effect of direct ties with 95% confidence intervals increases the likelihood of entering the jury’s attention space 
with a positive and significant coefficient for panel 0 (.045, p<.05). However, the conditional marginal effect of direct ties 
does not significantly influence entry into panel 1. Figure 4 shows that the conditional marginal effect of reciprocity with 
95% confidence intervals increases the likelihood of entering the jury’s attention space with a positive and significant 
coefficient for panel 0 (1.374, p<.01) and a positive and significant coefficient for panel 1 (.006, p<.05). Finally, Figure 5 
shows that the conditional marginal effect of cliquishness with 95% confidence intervals increases the likelihood of entering 
the jury’s attention space with a positive and significant coefficient for panel 0 (.422, p<.01), but the conditional marginal 
effect of cliquishness on entering panel 1 is negative and significant (-.371, p<.01). 
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impact of direct ties on recognition by interacting the prior positive experience variable with the direct ties 
variable. If self-reproduction prevails, the interaction term should be positive because the direct ties 
effect would be primarily driven by past positive experiences; but if intellectual distance is at work, 
then the interaction could even become negative as a previous joint victory renders the producer-jury 
member relationship more salient and visible. The interaction was negative and significant in both 
panels: -.403 (p<.05) for the first panel and -.465 (p<.05) for the second panel. We interpret this result 
as evidence supporting intellectual distance: the suspicion of favouring project members with whom 
jurors worked and won in the past puts the latter under stronger peer scrutiny, so reducing the 
likelihood that jury members will try to reward projects in which past collaborators are involved. 
We also looked at the impact of having mediated (i.e., indirect) ties to jury members on the 
likelihood of being rewarded. Previous studies have shown how individuals are more willing to share 
their resources (here prestige) with people who are just a few steps removed in their social network 
(Goeree et al., 2010; Baldassarri & Grossman, 2013). Accordingly, following Aadland et al. (2018) we 
calculated the median geodesic distance between each individual advertising project member and the 
peer jury members. We then grouped together individual producers with a degree of separation from 
jurors equal to or greater than 6, and assigned them the value 6. This operationalization follows the 
six degrees of separation theory (Milgram, 1967). To facilitate the interpretation of the results, we 
measured the variable in terms of nearness between jury members and producers. We did so by 
computing the reciprocal of the median geodesic distance between each individual advertising project 
member and the peer jury members. As our unit of analysis is the project, we created this variable as 
the median of each project member’s median distance from jury members. Although not reported 
here, the results confirmed the previous patterns: the coefficient of the variable was positive (5.579) 
and significant (p<.01) in the first panel (contrasting category 0 to categories 1 and 2), but non-
significant in the second panel (contrasting category 2 to categories 0 and 1). This suggests that the 
preferential allocation of symbolic resources by members of the evaluating audience is not 
 40 
 
circumscribed to direct ties, but also flows through indirect connections. Since the impact of the 
variables of theoretical interest changes across categories of the dependent variable, we further probed 
the existence of a curvilinear relationship between social proximity and awarding decisions. We then 
checked for the existence of a quadratic effect of direct ties on the outcome variable, but found no 
evidence for it. Yet, in line with Aadland et al. (2018), we found evidence for a curvilinear (inverted 
U-shaped) effect for the variable based on degree of separation in the second panel (contrasting 
categories 0 and 1 to category 2):15 the coefficient for the linear term was positive (36.770) and 
significant (p<.05), while the coefficient for the quadratic term was negative (-62.068) and significant 
(p<.05). Consistently with the patterns reported in Table 4, this result suggests that project members 
are less likely to win an award the closer they get to jury members. Thus, while awarding choices are 
patterned along relational lines, the likelihood of favoring the connected producers starts to decline 
when audience members and producers are too close within the peer-based professional network.16  
Robustness Checks. We conducted several additional analyses to gauge the validity of our 
findings. First, in order to rule out any aggregate effect stemming from our latent quality measure, we 
estimated our full models with the latent quality measure components. The results of the full model 
with the separate coefficients for project size (.094, p<.01), joint project (.267, p<.10), and project 
sophistication (.486, p<.01) in the model are qualitatively similar to those presented here, confirming the 
main pattern for the variables of theoretical interest. Second, advertising agencies may be inclined to 
invest more resources in advertising projects completed right before or during the Christmas holidays, 
when consumers have more time to watch media and go shopping. This might then affect not only 
the quality but also the type of projects on which advertising agencies work. Accordingly, we included 
                                                          
15 For the first panel comparing category 0 to categories 1 and 2 only the linear effect was statistically significant, in 
accordance with the main patterns reported in Table 4. 
16 We also used different cutoffs values for the degree of separation variable – e.g., 5 and 4 (following Dodds, Muhamad, & 
Watts, 2003) – but the curvilinear pattern did not change markedly. We still found evidence for a curvilinear (inverted U-
shaped) pattern for the degree of separation variable. For the 4 cutoff value, however, the coefficient for the linear term was 
positive (286.406) and marginally significant (p<.06), while the coefficient for the quadratic term was negative (-484.422) 
and marginally significant (p<.06) in the second panel (contrasting categories 0 and 1 to category 2).   
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a dummy for projects participating in The Silver Tag in the November and December contests. The 
dummy was not significant and the overall pattern remained stable. Third, the results were basically 
the same when we estimated the full model (Model 8) orthogonalizing all explanatory variables. 
Although not reported here, the results for the orthogonalized models are available from the authors 
upon request. Forth, we re-estimated the full model using a multinomial logit model to analyze the 
different established dichotomies comparing each of the dependent variable categories to a selected 
baseline category (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000). Although the multinomial model does not consider 
the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, it nevertheless allows one to estimate how the impact of 
a particular variable varies between the baseline category and the other categories. In the analysis, we 
first set each of the three categories (no placement, honorable mention, and award won) as the baseline 
category. These additional analyses, available from the authors upon request, yielded results that 
confirmed the patterns of Model 8. Finally, we checked the robustness of our main results by 
estimating the average treatment effect (ATE) of direct ties, reciprocity, and cliquishness on the likelihood 
of receiving an accolade using the Inverse Probability Weighting (IPW) technique (more details on 
how we estimated the ATE are reported in Appendix 2). 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Over the past twenty years a large and growing stream of work at the intersection of organizational 
research, economic as well as cultural sociology has contributed to our understanding of evaluative 
processes as deeply interactional, emotional and mobilizing the self-concept of evaluators as much as 
their connoisseurship. In particular, organizational scholars have revealed various forms of 
preferential allocation at play in cultural fields such as peer bias (Cattani et al., 2014), status beliefs 
(Bielby & Bielby, 1999) and typecasting (Zuckerman et al., 2003). These studies demonstrate that 
recognition is not the result of a socially disembodied process of quality assessment in which audiences 
in charge of relinquishing valued symbolic resources apply a set of objective criteria consistently. Our 
findings extend this line of work by highlighting the influence of relational dynamics that are critical 
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for understanding the evaluative outcomes of peer-based tournament rituals. With only a few 
exceptions (Aadland et al., 2018), the reward patterning caused by the existence of “social 
intercourses” (Blau, 1977: 32) cutting across the audience-producer interface has been mostly 
bracketed out from studies concerned with the distribution of recognition in cultural fields. 
Juxtaposing the Bourdieusian understanding of symbolic fields with recent insights on evaluative 
practices and judgments in cultural domains (Lamont, 2009; Chong, 2013), we developed contrasting 
expectations about the consequences of audience-candidate social proximity on recognition outcomes. 
According to the self-reproduction view social proximity catalyzes recognition, as competing 
candidates that are more closely located to the audiences in the underlying social structure are seen as 
preferred award targets beyond the level that can be justified on the basis of achievement-based 
criteria. According to the intellectual distance view, social proximity deters recognition because it 
heightens audiences’ susceptibility to claims against their moral character, rendering reputational 
concerns more acute. 
We assessed the relative impact of these views by focusing on three different facets of social 
proximity – direct ties, reciprocity and cliquishness – and examined their role in shaping audiences’ 
allocation of awards among competing cultural producers. Based on an unusual combination of 
qualitative findings and statistical analyses, we found these three articulations of social proximity to be 
significantly associated with recognition (above and beyond status and quality considerations), thus 
offering evidence supportive of the “consecration through contagion” process postulated by Bourdieu 
(1988: 259) and first documented by Aadland et al. (2018). Interviews with field insiders helped us to 
substantiate the supposition that these effects underlie a fundamental process of self-perpetuation 
inherent to peer-based consecration rites, whereby the allocation of symbolic capital to a particular 
social object (i.e., actor, project, style, etc.) is at the same time a claim to the cultural legitimacy of the 
object itself. However, those interviews also revealed a much more nuanced story than would be 
expected by embracing a purely Bourdieusian view. Although we generally find that social proximity 
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increases recognition along relational lines, this result is neither univocal nor unequivocally indicative 
of the absence of intellectual distance-related dynamics. Some of our analyses do in fact offer 
compelling indications that the intellectual distance effect is at work as much as the self-reproductive 
mechanism. In particular, while all three measures of social proximity are predictive of candidates’ 
entry into audiences’ attention – i.e., moving from no recognition to honorable mention – only 
reciprocity appears to exert the extra boost that it is required to move from audiences’ attention to 
consecration space – i.e., moving from honorable mention to award victory. The effect of direct ties 
dissipates once candidates have achieved honorable mentions, that is to say audience-candidates ties 
do catalyze recognition (honorable mentions) but not its strongest manifestation (consecration). This 
change of significance across levels of recognition stands out even more strikingly for projects whose 
members and evaluating juries are jointly located in structurally cohesive regions of the network. 
Indeed, while being part of the same clan helps candidates to enter the restricted élite of professionals 
who are deemed worth of admiration, it actually depresses the odds of moving up from the merely 
good to the great, thus indicating that a purely self-reproductive account cannot fully explain our 
results. That we observe an inverted U-shaped relationship between consecration and our alternative 
measure of structural proximity based on degrees of separation, as first shown by Aadland et al. (2018), 
also appears to reinforce this ambivalent view, suggesting that at very high levels of structural 
proximity intellectual distance may actually outweigh self-reproduction.  
It is useful to further reflect on the possible conditions that may stifle or amplify one effect 
relative to the other. We start by noting two features that pertain to the nature of the evaluative setting, 
and then we discuss one feature that relate to the institutional environment in which the tournament 
ritual is embedded. First, because intellectual distance is premised on the key idea that cultural 
producers care deeply about the reputational ramifications of decisions that transgress the 
disinterestedness ideal, we expect the recognition-inhibiting effect of social proximity to be especially 
salient in settings in which audiences are subject to a high degree of scrutiny. This expectation is easy 
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to appreciate in our empirical setting, where the glass-looking nature of the evaluative interface not 
only implies that audience members know candidates’ identity, but also the identity of the evaluating 
audience members is itself in the public domain. Insofar as no public window exists into audience 
members’ identity, susceptibility to claims against moral character should decrease and the self-
reproduction effect should then dominate. Second, a depiction of audience-candidate social proximity 
as deterring recognition may benefit from organizational design mechanisms explicitly intended to 
dissuade the pursuit of self-serving interests. For example, turning to our setting, it is perfectly 
conceivable that the rotating structure of the jury mitigates preferential allocation along relational lines: 
audience members today will be competing candidates tomorrow. As Heinich noted (2009: 102), 
“those who grant recognition also depend on those who are granted it, in that their capacity to 
recognize is itself framed by strong expectations about its fairness.” Audiences whose choices signal 
departure from the professed values of their position can become tomorrow’s target of potential 
retributive behavior. Absent this rotating structure, dominance of self-reproduction over intellectual 
distance probably would be much more likely. Third, the expectation that recognition wanes with 
social proximity should vary with the evaluative cultures that constrain how evaluators behave and 
inform the content of their judgment (Lamont, 2012).  To the extent that evaluative cultures 
embedded in different institutional environments vary with respect to the customary rules that govern 
what is perceived fair, institutional settings characterized by strong meritocratic ideals should amplify 
intellectual distance dynamics over self-reproductive ones. The fact that we focus on Norway, the 
country with the highest level of social mobility in the world (Wilensky, 2002) and one of the countries 
with strongest meritocratic beliefs across societal strata (Mijs, 2016), may facilitate the surfacing of 
intellectual distance related effects. Of course, the ultimate validation of our framework should come 
only when these scope conditions are allowed to vary and tested for their implied interaction with the 
social proximity variables. Overall, our findings point to the importance of “bringing relationships 
back” into the analysis of consecration processes and, in so doing, offer new material for enriching 
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the vibrant scholarly debate on the role of social interactions in evaluative settings. We conclude by 
highlighting two general contributions to extant literature and delineating avenues for future research.  
Research on Social Evaluation 
As Jean-Paul Sartre (1948: 98) famously quipped: “There are qualities that we acquire uniquely through 
the judgment of others.” This is especially so for the quality of a cultural object “which is so difficult 
to define because it exists only in, and through, the circular relations of reciprocal recognition among 
peers” (Bourdieu, 1985: 19). Because cultural objects are subject to different interpretations, they exist 
within overtly competitive social arenas of consensual or contested meaning, in which peers – in their 
quest for distinction – engage in symbolic struggles over the criteria defining the legitimate modes of 
production and expression. The outcomes of these struggles are canonical understandings of worth, 
which elite peers enforce and reinforce through award contests. As stressed by Shymco and Roulet 
(2016: 41): “The process of peer recognition […] relies on the institutionalization of tools such as 
awards or rankings and is hence more likely to lead to a self-reinforcing […] evaluation.” In fact, not 
only are élite peers likely to have vested interests in preserving established notions of worth but also 
to use their own “power to consecrate” to protect them. The rich body of sociological evidence on 
peer resistance in art (White & White, 1965) and science (Barber, 1961) is especially indicative of this 
protective attitude. As an illustration, consider the French Academy of Fine Arts (Académie des Beaux 
Arts) in the 19th century. The French Academy assessed artwork and rewarded artists with prizes 
based on the evaluation of gatekeepers, who were members of the Academy. Success in the system 
depended upon receiving recognition from the Academy. In theory, the work by the artist was 
evaluated objectively; in practice, the gatekeepers tried to maintain their own power and that of their 
followers. As a result, artists associated with Academy members were more likely to win awards. Over 
the years, the members of the Academy took turns obtaining symbolic awards for their own affiliates, 
thus effectively assuring the continuity of the Academy’s orthodoxy (White & White, 1965). 
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The relational dynamics we highlighted are part and parcel of this Bourdieusian self-
reproductive process of recognition. Yet, as we noted above, our findings also help us to paint a more 
nuanced picture than would be afforded by the adoption of a purely Bourdieusian account of 
recognition as a “mere step in the search for personal distinction and […] domination” (Heinich, 2009: 
86). Such an account is not, in fact, fully reflective of the recognition dynamics permeating the 
Norwegian advertising rituals to the extent that it overlooks the self-understanding of individuals as 
fair judges and experts, whose evaluative practices are charged with emotional and reputational 
significance. In ostensibly meritocratic cultural settings characterized by strong vocational drive and 
professional ethos, the suspicions stemming from alleged transgressions of this ideal may be 
particularly severe for one’s reputation. Besides, any award winner depends on audience members’ 
judgment about the quality of her work, just as much as any audience depends on actual and potential 
awardees’ judgment about the quality of its choices: evaluators are called to the stand and held 
responsible for their own judgments. As Heinich (2009: 103) pointed out: “We certainly depend on 
those who have the power to recognize us, but this power is itself subordinate to our capacity to 
recognize it as relevant.” This, we believe, is key to understand the ambivalent effect of social 
proximity, namely that evaluators may be moved by self-serving interests and search for distinction 
(as largely predicated by Bourdieu-inspired scholarship), as much as the desire to signal their 
intellectual distance and deflect potential inauthenticity concerns away (as predicated by research more 
attentive to actual evaluative practices on the ground). 
Our study also seeks to respond to a few recent calls from tournament theorists who have 
voiced the need to be more sensitive to the social context in which tournaments’ evaluative practices 
take place. An important insight of our paper is to demonstrate how incorporating constructs and 
analytic tools from network theory helps to place tournaments more squarely into their contexts and, 
in so doing, to inform tournament theory by “exploring the influences of the social characteristics of 
participants on tournament outcomes” (Connelly et al., 2013: 36). Notably, because only a subset of 
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all social interactions are captured by a network constructed exclusively from project affiliation data, 
our findings should be interpreted as a lower bound on the importance of the social structure in 
patterning recognition. This interpretation is strengthened by the additional finding that the relational 
effects remain salient despite the co-location (i.e., in Oslo) of most of the advertising firms in our data 
set. In other words, while geographical proximity allows for multiple types of interaction among 
economic actors, it does not wash away the effect of interactions that involve project collaboration, 
be they direct or indirect.  
Research on Symbolic Capital  
Our relational approach offers a new lens through which appreciating the economic conversion value 
of symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1993). Particularly in societies where the search for knowledge about 
one’s worth in relation to others is intense, awards are crucial sources of recognition (Gallus & Frey, 
2016) and consumers treating them as judgment devices “transmute the producer’s symbolic capital 
into economic capital” (Rossman & Schilke, 2014: 88). Thus, awards won in film festivals may increase 
tenure at the box office, literary prizes may ensure access to exclusive distribution channels, and 
medals in science may increase an actor’s chances of getting research grants. All these may help in the 
same way as general prestige rankings do, but their presumed objectivity gives them special 
independence in swaying decisions, especially of people who have little direct knowledge of the 
recipient in question (Goode, 1978). In our contest, winning awards likewise is highly consequential 
for producers and their employers as awards help advertising agencies attract clients:  
“Awards become an easy measurement tool of where on the creative ranking the agency is. So, if a client is 
looking for a very creative agency, they know where to look because those are the ones that have won the most 
awards” (interview with the art director from a digital advertising agency). 
 
The economic conversion of symbolic capital is even more evident in the following quote:  
“[Awards] is our only marketing channel. This, I can write press releases about. I cannot write press releases 
about anything else. I can write press releases about how well we perform internationally or nationally. I can 
get a lot out of that. For us, it means business. Because we get press, we get clients” (interview with a copy 
writer from a digital advertising agency). 
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Thus, while one might be tempted to consider the relational allocation process documented in our 
study for its purely symbolic import if it had no effects beyond the attainment of recognition, 
recognition in turn has significant economic conversion value. This strong relationship can best be 
appreciated in Figure 6, which plots the linear prediction of operating profits based on the total 
number of The Silver Tag awards won by each firm in the previous year. Recognition is patterned 
along relational lines and is conducive to economic opportunities. This preferential allocation pattern, 
as a result, places a significant burden on peripheral cultural producers who are loosely connected to 
the field’s insiders. Stated differently, relational dynamics contribute to stratifying organizations not 
only in symbolic space, but also in economic space – particularly in those contexts where awards are 
used as proxies for the quality of a firm’s product offerings. As agents of consecration, social audiences 
play a key role in strengthening the market power of some firms by promoting their product offerings 
vis-à-vis those of other firms, so enhancing the perceived level of differentiation of those firms relative 
to competition (Cattani, Porac, & Tomas, 2017). 
<Insert Figure 6 here> 
Limits and Future Research 
Peer-based tournament rituals and awards contests more broadly share similarities with other settings 
that should encourage efforts at generalizability, but they also present unique features that should 
invite cautious consideration of possible boundary conditions. Promotion processes in labor markets 
strike us as a particularly interesting case in point for appreciating this tension. Let us first focus on 
the commonalities. Just like awards’ recipients in our setting, employees who are given promotions 
rank higher in prestige than those who are not. Also, similarly to our setting, social networks structure 
the matching process between professionals and positions, and symbolic resources (e.g., promotion) 
are allocated on the basis of evaluative practices among peers. There is even evidence suggesting that 
these decisions are patterned along cognitive lines in a way that closely resemble the normatively laden 
judgments that shape the distribution of symbolic capital in Bourdieusian fields. Recent research, for 
 49 
 
example, has demonstrated that job candidates exhibiting cultural fit with evaluators receive more 
attention and enjoy more favorable hiring outcomes because evaluators are more likely to fight for 
candidates with whom they feel a spark of commonality (Rivera, 2012). Indeed, a comparison of the 
fine-grained interpersonal processes through which relational and cultural based similarities shape 
homosocial reproduction in labor markets and domains of cultural production seems to us a promising 
avenue for future research. But let us now consider the differences. First, while the recipient of an 
award is certified as having already performed a particular task at an exceptional level, someone who 
is promoted has not yet proved he can do the job at all. The judgment is a manifestation of the 
evaluator trust about the future, rather than the evaluation of an achievement already reached (Goode, 
1978). Second, to accept a promotion is to agree to carry out a specific set of performances as long as 
one holds the position. In this respect, promotions clearly differ from awards. Third, and related to 
the previous point, awards are typically bestowed for an exceptional achievement in a specific type of 
activity. By contrast, the range of activities expected for one who has been promoted is usually wide. 
Words of caution should therefore accompany efforts at extending our results to the prestige dynamics 
that distinguish this, as well as other similar peer-based evaluative contexts such as funding committees 
in science (Boudreau et al., 2016), selection panels in charge of R&D decisions (Criscuolo et al., 2017), 
auditioning of musicians for symphony orchestras (Goldin & Rouse, 2000), or online user 
communities (Dahlander & Frederiksen, 2012). In short, if individuals aspire to awards and participate 
in tournament rituals it is because the prestige they get from them is socially distinct and embedded 
in a very particular symbolic structure (Goode, 1978). Thus, we encourage studies seeking to further 
explore the allocation of prestige with respect to both the stratifying impact of awards and the nature 
of the social processes that foster or inhibit their allocation to certain producers and not others.  
To the extent that the relational dynamics discussed in this paper place a burden on players 
less entrenched in the field’s prevailing canons, the question is then how peripheral players – whose 
view is more likely to challenge the orthodoxy – can gain traction in an established cultural field. The 
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question is particularly relevant considering that, with relatively few exceptions (e.g., Cattani et al., 
2014; Cattani & Ferriani, 2014; Goldberg, Hannan, & Kóvacs, 2016; Criscuolo et al., 2017; Fini, 
Jourdan, & Perkmann, in press), previous organizational research assumes that audiences are 
homogeneously aversive to novel claims, especially so when evaluative canons are agreed upon. When 
audiences are receptive to novel offers, prevailing research conventionally attributes such a reaction 
to the reputational resources deployed by the producer. Yet these resources are unlikely to be available 
to producers who are weakly embedded in the social structure of the field (i.e., newcomers, outsiders, 
mavericks, etc.) and therefore unconnected to the field’s insiders. Understanding the sources of 
variability in audiences’ receptiveness to novel claims is a fascinating problem. This study emphasizes 
the role of intellectual distance in curbing the stratifying effect of self-reproduction, but other such 
mechanisms merit further inquiry. 
The arguments we presented to articulate the impact of social proximity on recognition are all 
at the individual level even though the analysis is at the project (team) level. While this makes the 
statistical analysis a more conservative test, admittedly extending arguments at one level of analysis to 
a different level is not straightforward. However, as our field work also suggests, the influence of 
dyadic interactions between project and jury members are channelled into the collective deliberation 
of the jury by its members. Our data do not capture the process by which jury members arrive at such 
decisions, in particular how their (often) conflicting opinions are reconciled and consensus on which 
projects to reward is reached. Our combination of archival and interview data offered some insights, 
but future work should examine the underlying micro (individual) to macro (team) level processes in 
greater detail. We should also emphasize that the potential misalignment across levels may not be as 
critical as one might think because when a project receives an accolade every project member receives 
it as well. A different methodological approach such as conducting an experiment in a more controlled 
setting (i.e., laboratory) would be better suited to gain such a nuanced understanding of the evaluative 
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dynamics as well as better control for the quality of the project under evaluation. Future research 
might find this aspect worthy of more systematic investigation. 
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Figure 1. Awards Distribution for Jurors and Non-Jurors 
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Figure 2. Cohesion vs. Connection  
 
2a Co-membership without connection       2b Connection without co-membership 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Conditional Marginal Effect of Direct Ties 
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Figure 4. Conditional Marginal Effect of Reciprocity 
 
Figure 5. Conditional Marginal Effect of Cliquishness 
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Figure 6. The Silver Tag Awards Won and Operating Profits 
 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Data on Agencies Sampled for Interviews 
Agency Agency size Services Digital awards Respondent’s role   
Advertising 75-100 Full servicea Yes Digital advisor   
Advertising 75-100 Full service Yes Copywriter; Managing director  
Advertising 50-75 Full service Yes Digital advisor   
Advertising 40-50 Mass communication Yes Copywriter   
Advertising 10-20 Mass communication No Copywriter   
Advertising 10-20 All media No Art director   
Digital 20-30 Digital Yes Art director   
Digital 5-10 Digital No Digital advisor   
Digital 5-10 Digital Yes Digital advisor   
 
a Full-service agencies typically offer a wide range of services such as mass communication, direct marketing, 
digital, design, and sometimes media brokering. For some roles, we interviewed more than one professional for 
a total of 19 distinct interviews. 
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Table 2. Qualitative Evidence for Self-Reproduction from the Field17 
Perspective Representative Quotes 
 
 
 
 
Self-
reproduction 
 
 
 
“If two projects are equally good, then the project where project members and jurors know each other 
will win […] it is that these people share the same opinion about what is “important” and “not 
important”, as well as what is “right” and not “right.” They (the projects by candidates previously 
tied to the jurors) might therefore score higher on the criteria valued by the jurors who ‘administer the 
truth’ about what is good and not so good” (Account manager) 
“The Norwegian advertising industry is small…you meet the same people time and time again. It is 
therefore unavoidable that it becomes cliquish. Project members and jurors who know or who … 
[know about] each other are part of this cliquishness” (Former jury member) 
“And there is a small gang, for example, there is a small gang who has always gone to Cannes, and we sit and 
talk advertising all the time. Ok, this is going in this direction, this is what is right now, this is what we would 
like to emphasize. We want to stretch ourselves after these ideals, these goals. And then we share a common 
platform for what we think is good. And that makes us share common things. And if we think the same 
things, then we tend to reward… we tend to reward ideas that are common to our own. Those that we think is 
nice ourselves” (Copywriter) 
“I am convinced that good old-fashioned camaraderie plays a big part, not in terms of explicit bargaining, but 
more as an implied and continuous levelling of ‘some for all’ – within a circle of people who know each other” 
(Copywriter) 
 
 
 
 
Intellectual 
Distance 
 
“[…] you are saying something about yourself when you declare who deserves gold. You expose yourself” 
(Former jury member) 
 “It is a big problem if they (i.e., the members of the industry) come to believe you have a vested interest. If you 
favour that project […] you may end up in big trouble. I usually keep quiet or alternatively try to mention 
what is good about other projects in such situations” (Former jury member) 
 “That people in a way pay you back, that would surprise me a lot. …You don’t want to be caught in voting 
tactically” (Copywriter)  
“I want to underscore that my opinion is that jury’s actions and decisions made are made with the best intention 
[…] The whole process is very human yet extremely professional” (Former jury member) 
 “When I have been sitting in juries myself, I experience, I don’t know if its tactics. But there are different 
types of juries and different types of jobs. And quite easily a jury member with a “loud voice” can say that this 
is not very good. And then all the jobs are automatically devalued and jury members start competing to give 
lower scores because it is a little dangerous to award gold. You say something about yourself if you say that this 
deserves gold. Then you expose yourself. It’s easier to say that a job is bad than good” (Copywriter) 
                                                          
17 Most of the quoted respondents did not have English as a first language. Some quotes have been slightly edited by the 
author. Many quotes come from notes taken by one of the co-authors during the interviews and not from recorded material 
because respondents generally did not wish to have their answers recorded on tape for confidentiality reasons. 
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Table 3. Correlation Coefficients 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Allocation of accolades .409 .631 0 2 1                   
2. Project quality 0 .254 -.405 1.277 .34* 1                 
3. Median experience 3.529 3.989 0 30 .10* -.10* 1               
4. Competitive intensity 15.369 5.960 3 30 -.21* -.04 -.01 1             
5. Conflict of interest .436 .496 0 1 .19* .21* .17* -.09* 1           
6. Prior positive co-experience .261 .439 0 1 .19* .28* .20* -.03 .55* 1         
7. Status .439 .402 0 1 .27* .37* .26* -.05 .28* .38* 1       
8. Direct ties 1.021 1.178 0 5 .28* .35* .27* -.07 .59* .71* .50* 1     
9. Reciprocity .280 1.206 0 7 .34* .18* .15* -.15* .21* .22* .17* .23* 1   
10. Cliquishness .045 .510 0 7 .01 -.03 .03 .17 .09 .14 .10* .17* -.02 1 
*p < .05                         
N = 654                         
Condition number = 5.30                         
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Table 4. Partial Proportional Ordered Logit Model (clustered on contest/month) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Accolade all levels     
Project quality    2.651** 
     (.41) 
Median experience    .046* 
     (.02) 
Competitive intensity    -.086** 
     (.02) 
Conflict of interest    .319 
     (.20) 
Prior positive co-experience    .077 
     (.21) 
Status    .712** 
     (.24) 
Panel 0: category 0 vs. categories 1 and 2     
Direct ties .513**    
  (.07)    
Reciprocity  7.484**   
   (.36)   
Cliquishness   .128*  
    (.06)  
Constant -1.280** -.890** -.713** -.175 
  (.17) (.08) (.09) (.31) 
Panel 1: categories 0 and 1 vs. category 2     
Direct ties .406**    
  (.11)    
Reciprocity  .359**   
   (.08)   
Cliquishness   -12.079**  
    (1.00)  
Constant -2.990** -2.676** -2.459** -2.230** 
  (.17) (.10) (.07) (.29) 
N 654 654 654 654 
Wald chi2 63.25** 449.23** 146.03** 151.90** 
Pseudo R2 .05 .08 .00 .13 
Log pseudolikelihood -505.57 -489.13 -531.78 -465.07 
AIC 1019.15 986.25 1071.56 946.15 
 
†p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01 -- Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 4. Partial Proportional Ordered Logit Model (clustered on contest/month) – cont’d 
  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
  Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Accolade all levels     
Project quality 2.540** 2.431** 2.710** 2.368** 
  (.41) (.42) (.41) (.42) 
Median experience .037† .032 .048* .024 
  (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) 
Competitive intensity -.086** -.075** -.091** -.080** 
  (.02) (.02) (.01) (.01) 
Conflict of interest .186 .257 .310 .119 
  (.21) (.22) (.20) (.22) 
Prior positive co-experience -.196 -.013 .044 -.316 
  (.24) (.23) (.22) (.26) 
Status .571* .674** .681** .506* 
  (.26) (.24) (.23) (.26) 
Panel 0: category 0 vs. categories 1 and 2     
Direct ties .247**   .246* 
  (.10)   (.11) 
Reciprocity  7.084**  6.856** 
   (.37)  (.38) 
Cliquishness   .280** .252** 
    (.09) (.10) 
Constant -.214 -.335 -.097 -.299 
  (.30) (.32) (.26) (.25) 
Panel 1: categories 0 and 1 vs. category 2     
Direct ties .143   .148 
  (.13)   (.15) 
Reciprocity  .190*  .203* 
   (.09)  (.09) 
Cliquishness   -10.419** -12.356** 
    (1.00) (1.05) 
Constant -2.121** -2.321** -2.139** -2.148** 
  (.31) (.31) (.23) (.28) 
N 654 654 654 654 
Wald chi2 152.13** 548.40** 274.17** 714.22** 
Pseudo R2 .13 .17 .13 .18 
Log pseudolikelihood -462.67 -441.65 -463.24 -437.50 
AIC 945.35 903.30 946.48 903.00 
 
†p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01 -- Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 5. Partial Proportional Ordered Logit Model  
 Accolade all levels 
 
Model 9  
(Clustered on Jury) 
Project quality 2.368** 
  (.53) 
Median experience .024 
  (.03) 
Competitive intensity -.080** 
  (.01) 
Conflict of interest .119 
  (.27) 
Prior positive co-experience -.316* 
  (.16) 
Status .506** 
  (.15) 
Panel 0: category 0 vs. categories 1 and 2  
Direct ties .246* 
  (.12) 
Reciprocity 6.856** 
  (.42) 
Cliquishness .252* 
  (.12) 
Constant -.299 
  (.32) 
Panel 1: categories 0 and 1 vs. category 2  
Direct ties .148 
  (.24) 
Reciprocity .203** 
  (.07) 
Cliquishness -12.356** 
  (1.22) 
Constant -2.148** 
  (.34) 
N 654 
Wald chi2 418.49** 
Pseudo R2 .18 
Log pseudolikelihood -437.50 
AIC 885.00 
 
†p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01 -- Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Appendix 1 
The jury deliberation process 
Our interviews and archival sources clearly suggest that the jury evaluation process during our 
observation window was cautiously designed to ensure procedural fairness. It proceeded as follows. All 
jury members scrutinize the competing projects individually during the days prior to the jury meeting and 
produce a personal shortlist of their five favorite projects that they bring to the jury meeting. All the 
projects on the jury members’ short lists are part of the first cut. The projects that made the first cut are 
then discussed by the jurors in the jury meeting. Through the discussions, the jury collectively 
discriminates between the projects that made the first cut and rejects the projects that are not deemed 
sufficiently worthy to make the jury’s shortlist of five projects. Next, the jury discusses each project on 
this shortlist and each juror argues for his or her preferred winner under the leadership of the jury 
president. After collectively discussing the jury’s shortlist, each jury member assigns points to the 
different projects on the jury’s shortlist. The project that the juror prefers the most receives 5 points, the 
project the juror thinks is second best receives 4 points, and so on. Once all the jurors have cast their 
votes, the jury sums up the points each juror has awarded each project and divides the sum for each 
project by the number of jurors. Whenever jury members have a clear conflict of interest – e.g., they were 
involved in a project that was submitted to the contest or an advertising agency for which they were 
currently working submitted a project – they are not allowed to partake in the evaluation of that project: 
they have to exit the jury room and wait in the hallway while the project is being discussed. For this 
project, the score of the juror with a conflict of interest is set equal to the average of the other jurors’ 
scores. Once the jury evaluation process is finished, the jury issues a justification – drafted by the jury 
president – that accompanies the announcement in industry media. 
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Appendix 2 
Results with the Inverse Probability Weighting (IPW) 
To further check the robustness of our main results reported in Model 8 (Table 4), we estimated the 
average treatment effect (ATE) of direct ties, reciprocity, and cliquishness on the likelihood of receiving an 
accolade. We estimated the ATE from our observational data using the Inverse Probability Weighting 
(IPW) technique. This technique uses estimated probability weights to correct for the missing data 
problem stemming from the fact that each subject (here project) is observed in only one of the potential 
outcomes. The IPW estimator uses a model for the treatment instead of a model for the outcome and 
estimates the predicted treatment probabilities to weigh the observed outcomes. The inverse probability 
of being in the observed treatment group is obtained by modeling the observed treatment as a function 
of the project’s characteristics that determine the treatment group. The difference between the average 
weighted treated outcomes and the average weighted non-treated outcomes estimates the ATE. We 
calculated the estimated probability weights and ATE for each of our treatments based on project quality, 
median experience, competitive intensity, and status as they were the statistically significant controls (Model 4).  
We first defined the treatment level for each project based on our direct ties variable. Specifically, 
each project was treated using a cut-off rule of >= 4. This cut-off classifies as treated projects in the 
upper decile, making the test very conservative. All projects with a value of direct ties >= 4 were assigned 
the value of 1 (treated) while those with direct ties <4 were assigned the value of 0 (untreated). The results 
presented in Table 6 show a significant positive ATE for treatments greater than the chosen cut-off value. 
In Model 10, the ATE for direct ties >= 4 is .635 (p<.05). We also estimated the ATE of the reciprocity 
variable using the cut-off rule of >= 1 to identify the treatment group based on our set of covariates. 
This cut-off classifies as treated the projects in the upper decile, again making the test highly conservative. 
The results are reported in Model 11 and shows a positive (.866) and significant (p<.01) ATE for reciprocity 
>= 1. Finally, we estimated the ATE of the cliquishness variable using a cut-off rule of > 1 to identify our 
treatment group based on our set of covariates. The results show a negative (-.382) and significant (p<.01) 
effect for cliquishness > 1 (Model 12). Finally, we assessed the issue of covariate balance. When the 
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distribution of a covariate is the same for all levels of treatment, the covariate can be said to be balanced. 
If a treatment model is well specified, the IPW functions of the covariates from the model are balanced. 
We performed over-identification tests for covariate balance for all treatment models, and none of the 
tests were statistically significant indicating that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the IPW models 
balance all our covariates. Although we cannot claim causality, the results of these analyses lend additional 
support to the relationship between our variables of theoretical interest and the allocation of awards in 
peer-based tournament rituals. 
 
Table 6. Inverse Probability Weighting Models 
 
  Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
  Direct ties Reciprocity Cliquishness 
   >= 4  >= 1  > 1 
ATE .635* .866** -.382** 
  (.26) (.09) (.05) 
AI robust standard errors     
N = 
654       
**p < .01, *p < .05     
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